So what is Pervez Musharraf up to, appointing volatile Malik Qayyum as the Attorney General (AG) of Pakistan in place of cerebral and sedate Makhdoom Ali Khan? Does the sea-change in personalities signal, as when Tikka Khan was sent to replace Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub in early March 1971 in (then) East Pakistan, a deliberate intent for confrontation?

His legal acumen notwithstanding, Malik Qayyum was the point-man for the government in the CJP Reference, or is there more to it than meets the eye? Why was some crucial "evidence" withdrawn, making the Reference toothless?

Wily and seasoned politician Chaudhry Shujaat advised the president to withdraw the Reference and make the PM the fall guy, resigning "in the best interests of the country." Chaudhry Shujaat was tasked with broaching this with Shaukat Aziz as his (Shujaat's) own suggestion.

Shaukat probably took former PM Zafarullah Jamali's "sacrifice" in being sent out into the cold as the example not to emulate; no resignation was forthcoming. Shaukat's refusal to fall on his sword should have served as an indicator of things to come. Compromises notwithstanding, Musharraf is not the type to fade silently away into the night. Still, why is he bent on being elected while still in uniform, despite what is surely a legal inevitability?

Was the Reference turned post-facto into a "Noora Kushti" meant to give the CJP credibility? And when the president's election in uniform is challenged legally, as it certainly will be, is a favourable verdict from the Supreme Court (SC) guaranteed? The question is not one of legality; it is one of morality.

The proposition of fighting the election in uniform will force those who see a continued role for him as a civilian president to oppose this. With the survival of his presidency at stake, why should Pervez Musharraf care?

On October 12, 1999, Pervez Musharraf had the die-hard support of a handful of senior officers of the army, most put into crucial appointments within hours of his appointment as COAS. A vast majority of the army will always follow their chief anywhere.

To quote my article, "Power Play" of October 17, 1998, only 10 days after he took over as COAS: "A power play did take place on October 7, 1998, and even though Mian Nawaz Sharif seems to have come out ahead, he should thank his lucky stars that he had Gen Jehangir Karamat (JK) to contend with, a mild man of gentlemanly demeanour, known not only for his superior intellect but also for his firm commitment to democracy. If the inclination of the politicians to indulge in power play in the uniformed ranks persists, the PM may well have sufficient cause to remember JK with a lot of nostalgia, sooner rather than later."

Only a year later, on Oct 12, 1999, when Mian Sahib tried again, he tangled with the wrong guys, they were ready for him. Zarrar Company made it to GHQ from Tarbela in 90 minutes, another SSG company was heli-lifted from Mangla to the back of the PM's house many minutes less than that, beating (then) Comd. 10 Corps Mahmood and Salahuddin Satti's III Bde to the PM's gate.

After 9/11, as Musharraf became comfortable in the presidency, his die-hard supporters became dispensable, being sent out to pasture one by one. Satti, presently CGS, is the solitary survivor; Rashid Qureshi has just made a "comeback."

The last of the "Mohicans," Lt Gen Ghulam Ahmed (GA), as Musharraf's Principal Staff Officer (PSO), was the traffic policeman to the presidential office. His untimely death in a car accident opening the floodgates for "nouveau friends."

Musharraf valued GA's advice, sometimes quite contrary to Musharraf's own inclinations, till mid-2002; that was his strong point. As his domestic and international stature grew, Musharraf, surrounded by "yesmen" and blatant sycophants, tended to shrug off good advice; the "shooting of messengers bringing bad tidings" resulting in a series of gaffes beginning with the referendum in 2002. At the core of any leadership lies the ability of the leader to be amenable to good advice, and, thereof, the leader's courage to go against his own perceptions.

Most people do want a democracy, and many would prefer an equitable power-sharing arrangement where politicians do not run riot, as they have done in the past. This must be institutionalised, not dependant on individuals.

To quote my article, "Inevitable Power Play," as for back as October 16, 1999: "Involvement in the governance will have a debilitating effect on their (the army's) efficiency and in the performance of their primary mission of defending the integrity and sovereignty of the nation. A country's (and its army's) good is always best served by the armed forces staying away from running the country on a day-to-day basis. That said, circumstances beyond their control were forced onto the army, the inevitable power-play being triggered by the attempted civilian coup by the former PM (formulated by his incredible "think-tank" on board the aircraft, enroute to Abu Dhabi). When the die was cast, there were no options except to either act or sit back and see a split in the army lead to possible civil war. While democracy is always preferable to the most benign of military rules, it is better to have military rule than to have no country at all."

Can the opposition achieve consensus by choosing someone credible for the presidential elections? In the face of devastating erosion of the image of the army, a genuine alternative, having the army's trust and respect as a credible check and balance in the working of our democracy, could be a real challenge for Pervez Musharraf even if he comes safely through the legal minefield.

The "star choice" is Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, who displayed courage and tenacity (and remarkable physical endurance) in standing up to the Reference. If the COAS can avail an office of profit and fight the elections in or out of uniform, how is the two year's restriction going to stop the CJP's eligibility?

Or someone non-controversial, of the stature and integrity of Air Marshal Asghar Khan, or non-political like Pervez Musharraf's course-mate Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, still widely respected and admired in the army as a principled person and an outstanding combat soldier who actually took part in two wars for Pakistan.

And what about Lt Gen Lehrasab Khan, another unsung hero of two wars for Pakistan, a veteran of "Operation Gibraltar" exactly 42 years ago to the day? There is no dearth of suitable candidates!

Notwithstanding Malik Qayyum, or the commitment Ms Benazir is supposed to have made, all the best plans laid by men and women can come to naught.

Ikram Sehgal is an eminent Pakistani political analyst and columnist.