Bill Clinton pointed out the difference between conservative Republicans who, like Robert Kagan (Power and Weakness), would prefer the US to remain the strongest and the biggest power in the world, or like New Sovereignists, who look at international law with disdain, and Clintonians who would like to build a world with rules and partnership and habits of behaviour that the people would like to live in and "in which we [the US] are no longer the only military, economic, and political superpower in the world."

President George Bush, surrounded by members of the New American Century with their imperial outlook, never understood this point of view, and was determined that America should continue to have omnipotent power and "bless" the rest of the world with democracy; a mission that Francis Fukuyama (Should Democracy be Promoted or Demoted: Stanley Foundation) thinks should be pursued by placing it "in a broader context of promoting economic development, reducing poverty, and furthering good governance."

Fukuyama argues that democracy is culturally rooted, and not a universal good; besides, the respect for the principle of sovereignty and the need for sequencing in the introduction of democratic reform do not encourage democracy promotion as desired by the US.

The world is now aware that the Bush administration's drive to put Saddam Hussein to eternal rest has produced an Iraq mired in internecine, sectarian, and suicidal fighting, causing untold death and destruction both to the Iraqis and the coalition forces. The Iraqis' participation in various elections in 2005 was driven more by the desire to promote Shiite supremacy than to establish liberal democracy.

Now the Bush administration's exit strategy, "to stay the course," is opposed by an increasing number of members of the Congress, and a sizeable number of US nationals who would like their country to be extricated from the Iraqi quagmire.

The result has been a loss of international confidence in the American model of democracy promoted by the Bush administration's uncaring pursuit of war on terror, and has brought about nostalgia for the values propagated by the founding fathers of America, that had protected the free world from the invidious intrusion of the colonial powers (e.g. Monroe Doctrine) and against the onslaught of communist ideology for most part of the twentieth century. The values encouraged emulation by many countries, albeit with various degrees of imperfection, voluntarily through unfettered expression of the will of the people.

This essay is an attempt to fathom a probable place in a post-unipolar world for a small country like Bangladesh. One school of thought believes that a world without the US hegemonic role would be an old fashioned multi-polar world, stitched together by great powers like post-Napoleonic 19th century Europe, in which Russia and the United Kingdom played the prominent role.

In the 21st century, the binding glue would in all possibility be the US, Russia, China, India and the European Union. "In this kind of world," according to Paul Starobin (National Journal-Beyond Hegemony-Dec 2006) "the principal powers would have their own tacitly accepted spheres of influence. Lesser powers would fall under their sway."

Should that happen, either China, thought as a possible successor to the US as a global hegemony having the largest GDP (a notion dismissed by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye and President Carter's National Security advisor Zbigniew Brezinski), or India aspiring to be a global power if its growth rate is any indication, would stake their claim for regional leadership.

Professor Bradley Thayer (Missouri State University) holds the view that the emergence of China as a superpower would herald, for the first time in the history of the West, a non-Western power dominating the world far more thoroughly than the Ottomans did. It is believed that a basic principle of the hegemonic system is that the weaker powers tend to go with the strongest power, even if the weaker ones have strong cultural aversion and dislike its value system.

It is possible that Bangladesh, wedded to democratic principles, though corrupted beyond recognition by the immediate past alliance government, would have more similarity with the Indian model than with the Chinese model, not because China is not a friend and does not help Bangladesh (despite the huge trade imbalance between the two countries) but because of the authoritarian political system the Chinese have goes against our grain.

Additionally, notwithstanding the India-fear factor being dominant in certain quarters in Bangladesh, our shared history and racial commonality would make India more readily acceptable to Bangladesh as a partner in progress. Evidently, such a course in our foreign relations should not be pursued to the exclusion of our relations with others, which, in any case, in this age of globalization is neither possible nor desirable. Besides our trade and economic links with the West is so vast that our survival dictates an open-ended relationship with all countries of the world.

While chalking out our preference we have not yet been able to gauge India's preference to have substantive relations with Bangladesh, notwithstanding friendly remarks made by diplomats, and our total bilateral trade (both formal and informal) with India being a substantial part of our global trade.

The G-8 countries, the Bush administration, and European Union are now courting India, with little qualitative change in her relations with Russia. In that context, a euphoric India may not have sufficient time to attend to relations with Bangladesh. It is also difficult to understand fully whether India considers us as an extension of the seven sisters infested with insurgency.

Bangladesh is suspected by Delhi of providing shelter and money to the rebels. Since chaos means unpredictability, it is doubtful that India would like to have Bangladesh as an imbalanced country, unable to contain the Islamic extremism that we have experienced in the recent past, and that perhaps is dormant for the time being.

It is, therefore, imperative that, for our own sake and to act as a responsible member of the international community, we adopt democracy responsive to popular will, but firmly based on institutional foundations so that the aberrant has to account for his misdeeds whenever these occur. Bangladesh simply cannot afford to go back to the "business as usual" practiced in the past.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.