The Supreme Court ruling weakens an embattled Musharraf further and demonstrates the unwillingness of Pakistan's civilians to endlessly obey the military's commands. Musharraf now has two options.

He could recognize the emerging reality and initiate a process of national reconciliation that allows civilian institutions -- from courts and the civil services to political parties and civil society organizations -- to function independently within their respective spheres.

Or he could persist with the doctrine of the military's supremacy, which has polarized Pakistan along several lines.

Musharraf recently told newspaper editors that he believed in "unified command," which indicates that he is yet to understand how he and his military predecessors have obstructed the emergence of a consensus system of governance that absorbs differences within society without widespread resort to violence and tearing apart of the country.

The notion of a single individual leading the nation to greatness has been embedded in the Pakistan army's thinking ever since Field Marshal Ayub Khan introduced it as a substitute for national consensus, constitutional rule, and rule of law.

In his quest for unified command, Ayub Khan fragmented the Pakistani nation within the first few years of its creation. Pakistan was declared an ideological state and the military was identified as the guardian of both the ideology and the state.

The chief of the army became the final arbiter of national interest. Those disagreeing with this scheme of things were seen as anti-state elements.

The result of the Ayub Khan model was the alienation of Pakistan's erstwhile eastern wing. Pakistan's Bengali political leaders did not agree with Ayub Khan's undiluted hostility towards India, nor were they amenable to the idea of a centralized state.

Ayub Khan lamented that he could not understand how Pakistan could become a nation if it were to retain several national languages or multiple cultures. He was clearly unfamiliar with the political experience of nations such Switzerland (with four national languages) and unwilling to look towards India, where pluralism worked quite well, -as an example.

So deep-rooted was Ayub Khan's belief in the army as Pakistan's saviour that when he was forced to resign in 1969 amid massive street demonstrations, he chose not to transfer power to a civilian under the terms of the constitution he had himself ordained in 1962.

Ayub Khan transferred power to another general, Yahya Khan, who further polarized the nation by refusing to transfer power to elected politicians he considered unworthy, even after holding free and fair elections.

When the Pakistan army lost East Pakistan and surrendered to the joint forces of India and the new republic of Bangladesh in 1971, every West Pakistani civilian knew that Yahya Khan's hold on power was untenable.

But Yahya Khan thought otherwise, and was preparing to announce a new constitution for the remainder of Pakistan when a revolt by junior army officers forced him to transfer power to elected civilians.

Musharraf's humiliation at the hands of the Supreme Court should be cause for him and his fellow army officers to review their fundamental approach to governance. The doctrine of unified command should be abandoned in favour of governance by national reconciliation and consensus.

The people must have the right to vote governments in and out. The politicians they elect must be able to govern according to the constitution until their term runs out. Judges should adjudicate disputes according to law and not as per the doctrine of necessity. The army should defend the country against enemies identified by the elected parliament, and army chiefs should have fixed terms.

Musharraf sees no contradiction in his assertion that Pakistan is in a state of war with Islamist extremists, and his desire to have his way on all issues big or small. Nations must unite at times of war, but Musharraf has not done anything to overcome any of Pakistan's divisions to focus exclusively on fighting terrorists and militants.

Pakistan is polarized between rich and poor, Islamist and secularist, and pro-military and pro-civilian rule. Ethnic divisions not only persist, they seem to have been aggravated over the last eight years.

Democracies subsume disagreements and diversity by allowing the majority to have its way until the next election, while protecting the rights of the minority under law. Authoritarianism, or "unified command" as Musharraf describes it, simply hardens the divisions in society.

Husain Haqqani is Director of Boston University's Center for International Relations, and Co-Chair of the Islam and Democracy Project at Hudson Institute, Washington D.C. He is author of the book Pakistan between Mosque and Military.