Musharraf himself was the target of an assassination attempt when the aircraft carrying him was fired upon (the attempt was described by Delhi-based South Asia Intelligence Review as, at best, ludicrous, with no significant danger to the president at any time), and his regime continues to face challenges, the latest being the London meeting of All Parties Conference that accused the Musharraf regime of bringing "Pakistan to the edge of a precipice, leading to strife, chaos and the threat of disintegration."

Daniel Markey (of the Council of Foreign Relations) in a recent article (Foreign Affairs -- July/August) suggested that the choice facing the US "between supporting Pakistan's army and promoting democracy has always been a false one. Both are necessary. Only by helping to empower civilians and earning the trust of the army at the same time will the United States successfully prosecute the long war against extremism and militancy."

It has been argued in favour of Daniel Markey's premise that societies like that of Pakistan, burdened with the attributes of tribalism, preclude fairness and justice to the people. Added to this feudalistic character of the society is the constant fear of Hindu India overrunning smaller (but nuclear) Pakistan.

It has been suggested that the Pakistan army's and ISI's retention of ties with the militants and Taliban sympathizers are a hedge against abandonment by the US in case of an Indo-Pak conflict. Besides, given their long-standing relationship with the Islamists, they were never serious about fighting terrorists.

Despite the common belief that the Talibans are still present in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata), and that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are living in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, some South Asian experts say that the US administration should broaden its relations with the army as a constant in the power politics of Pakistan, and even if a civilian government were to come to power it would have to negotiate its perilous relationship with the army.

Ayesha Siddiqa writes in her book Military Inc. that "the military's power allows it to define its economic interests and exploit public and private resources, a behaviour that increases the organization's appetite for power." Siddiqa's contention is strengthened by the belief that the Pakistan military will not accept any dilution of its power, however tainted some elements of the army remain by Islamist extremism and Jihadist ideology. The future of Pakistan would be better served by a choice between the military and the democrats, and not the military and the Mullahs, as constantly propagated by the vested quarters.

Evidently there is a contradiction between the US priority in fighting terrorism and Pakistan, labeled as a front liner in the war on terror, having an ambivalent attitude towards the Islamists. One should not forget that, but for the support of President Musharraf's political party (PML-Quaid-e-Azam), the Muttahida Majlis-a-Amal (MMA), a conglomerate of Islamist political parties, would not have secured double-digit votes in the last election.

The Islamists' political hold in NWFP and Balochistan were furthered by the active cooperation of the army and ISI, and the ideological leaning of the people of that area, in support of Islamic orthodoxy, has been translated into anti-Americanism.

During the summer of 2006, a considerable number of militants had been able to find sanctuary in Pakistan that prominent Afghan Taliban leaders were managing to plan operations from Pakistan and that Pakistan border units lacked the will or the capacity to cut off cross-border infiltration.

Veteran journalist Robert Kaplan sees Pakistan as an Yugoslavia in the making, albeit with nuclear weapons, and that the Afghanistan situation, Osama bin Laden, and the fighting in Kashmir "obscure the core issue in South Asia: the institutional meltdown in Pakistan. And as was true of Yugoslavia, it is the bewildering complexity of ethnic and religious divisions that makes Pakistan so fragile."

Leading US analyst on South Asia, Stephen Cohen, is so disenchanted with President Musharraf that he compares him with General Yahya Khan, and is skeptical that the idea of Pakistan as a state can work.

The reason for the muddled political situation was the recent sacking by President Musharraf of Chief Justice Ifthikar Chowdhury, who has now become the symbol of opposition to the government. Pakistan's judiciary was never effectively independent.

In Pakistan, the dream of its founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah, "an impeccably dressed Westernized Muslim with Victorian manners and secular outlook," was shattered by an increasingly authoritarian and theocratic establishment that Stephen Cohen calls "moderate oligarchy"-- an informal political system that ties together the military, the civil service, some chosen members of the judiciary, and the economic elite who, lacking legitimacy in the support of the people, opted for Islam as an instrument of policy.

The Bush administration cannot be unaware of the Islamization of the Pakistani poor and middle class through the large number of madrasas that regularly pour into the Pakistani society a considerable number of youngsters well versed in religious studies, but most of them lack the necessary skills required for employment in jobs in IT or management or in other areas.

The Brussels based International Crisis Group has expressed the fear that President Musharraf may declare a state of emergency, suspending fundamental rights and effectively declaring martial law. ICG fears that suppression of popular response against such a move would produce chaos and violence, and ultimately increase the influence of the Islamists and further anti-US feeling.

Gareth Evans, President of ICG, in a speech (June 15), said: "another less edifying experience has been the constant wriggling of Western, and in particular US, policy makers in the face of Parvez Musharraf's continuing authoritarian rule in Pakistan, and in particular the contempt that continues to be expressed by so many of them, more veiled in public but quite open in private, towards the democratic parties as they struggle with signs of growing popular and elite support, to recover ground. Despite the manifest failings of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif I, for one, feel strongly that New York Governor Al Smith was absolutely right when he said in the 1920s that the only cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy."

The Bush administration, in its mono-centric pursuit of the war on terror, is willing to ignore a Pakistan in disarray. Gareth Evans' advocacy of a liberal political system in Pakistan is further strengthened by the apparent failure of President Musharraf's government to contain violence in the northern part of the country.

In a recent report, The New York Times alleged that Pakistani security forces have been out-gunned and out numbered in NWFP by the militants, and that the security forces have ceded authority to the Talibans and their sympathizers. As a result, "there is a general policy of appeasement towards the Talibans, which has further emboldened them."

The Bush administration, that has been giving Pakistan two billion dollars a year for the last five years, may wish to take stock of the Lal Masjid episode, so eloquently explained by cricketer turned politician Imran Khan to British journalist David Frost in a recent interview.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.