The idea was first floated in 1979 by then Major (later Brig. Gen retd.) Sakhawat Hossain -- now an EC member -- in a paper at the Mirpur Staff College. Ershad picked up the idea, and apparently set up an NSC in 1985, but this remained moribund, even under the three subsequent civilian governments since 1991.

Since the emergency, talk of an NSC has blown hot and cold. In early March, media reports mentioned that the interim government was serious about setting up one, but never got round to doing it. The Communications Adviser, Maj. Gen (retd) MA Matin, confirmed on July11 that the proposal was in cold storage (Daily Star, July 12).

Lo and behold, a day later the idea was resurrected, from an unexpected quarter. On July 12, BNP Secretary General Mannan Bhuiyan issued a 13-point reform program that included, among others, establishing of an NSC, citing various reasons. They are analysed below (see Daily Star July 13). Interestingly, some AL reformers have also espoused the idea of an NSC. Coincidence? Or do endangered species think alike?

Analysis of Bhuiyan's proposal
Bhuiyan justifies his proposal by asserting that "NSC is playing an important role in different countries by helping in ensuring security and facing crises." NSCs are "operating effectively in countries like US, UK, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Indonesia and Malaysia," and play "… a fruitful role in ensuring balance of power in the governance system."

Hence, an NSC in Bangladesh would yield the following benefits: "help protect the country's independence and sovereignty and ensure security," and "contribute to ensuring law and order, curbing terrorism and militancy, and protecting energy, food and water resources."

A number of countries have set up NSCs. But Bhuiyan did not elaborate on their rationale, working, or effectiveness. So it is impossible to judge what Bhuiyan really thinks of the viability of the NSC's.

Rationale for NSCs
Basically, there are two reasons why countries establish NSCs. First, to provide a forum at the highest level for discussing foreign policy issues with wide security implications. Two types of NSCs fall under this category.

In the first are those of the big countries like the US (National Security Council); Russian Federation (Security Council); and PR of China (Central Military Commission). India's NSC established, by the BJP in 1998, might be included because Delhi has the bomb, substantial territory, and is an emerging economic powerhouse. All these countries have legitimate global and/or regional interests.

In the second category are smaller countries with acute, localized, security concerns. One is Iran. It's Supreme NSC, founded in 1998, deals with its nuclear program. This is a major bone of contention between Tehran and Washington that could spark a conflict.

Another is Israel, whose NSC was established in 1999 by arch-hawk Benjamin Netanyahu to coordinate security issues, despite the fact that Israel has not fought any big war since 1979.

An NSC in Sri Lanka is understandable because the country has an ongoing civil war. But it appears to deal only with issues arising from this conflict. Not much is known about Malaysia's NSC. Since Malaysia is politically stable and at peace with its neighbours, the rationale for an NSC appears weak.

The second category of NSC institutionalizes the military's role in politics. Two Muslim countries exemplify this.

The first is Turkey. It set up an NSC in 1961, following the 1960 coup, to integrate the military's participation in national affairs. While the services' role has declined over time, Turkish generals still have clout. Witness their statements on Turkey's secularism last April, when Abdullah Gul was nominated for president.

The other is Pakistan, which set up an NSC in 2004. This is a redundant body, since the army runs the country, has done so in the past, and is likely to do so under some guise or the other for some time in the future.

Relevance for Bangladesh
Considerations of global interests don't really apply to Bangladesh, a two-product economy (garments and remittances) that is hostage to overseas forces outside its control.

The ostensible rationale, then, for our NSC is to institutionalise the military's overarching behind-the-scenes role in national life since the emergency.

Without going into the constitutional or legal aspects of setting up an NSC, it's fair to state that its establishment will formalize the government's existing decision making mechanism, in which the services apparently have the final word on core issues.

This arrangement is likely to be case even after the NSC's establishment, even though the chairman and the majority of members may be civilians. But the voices of the three service chiefs will carry weight out of all proportion to their number. Public perception will also be influenced by the distribution of NSC staff between mufti and khaki, and location (inside or outside the cantonment).

A positive aspect of an NSC is that it will make overt what is now covert, and transparent what is now opaque, on where power lies. But will this organizational reform achieve all that Bhuiyan claims it can?

It may, but there is no guarantee that it will. Much will depend upon the quality of briefs it gets, the sagacity with which its members conduct discussions, and the soundness of the decisions they make. These inputs of judicious position papers, wise deliberations, and sensible outcomes can be provided by the existing governmental machinery, even if were there to be no NSC.

Having such an apex body may be organizationally ideal, but it by no means ensures good or satisfactory capability in dealing with our deep-seated problems of governance. We shouldn't be seduced by the seductive song of national security.

The interim government will be judged on performance, not by the organizational elegance of its supreme organs. The cat has to catch mice -- its colour doesn't matter.

Forming the NSC will likely exacerbate public misgivings -- considerably agitated since Hasina's arrest -- about the real and ultimate intentions, not only of the brass but also of the kite-flying role of Bhuiyan and his counterpart dissidents in the Awami League.

These concerns are likely to increase since there is no indication about the NSC's duration of existence, whether this is to be a temporary expedient or a permanent feature of our structure of governance.

Given all these uncertainties and, at best, a nebulous cost-benefit ratio, one wonders whether it is worth setting up the NSC? It's probably far better to use the existing machinery to do what needs to be done to get the country moving again.

Mumtaz Iqbal is a freelance contributor to The Daily Star.