To pre-empt the perceived threat, units of an infantry division were ordered to reinforce the lightly armed para-military Frontier Corps (FC) troops in the area. Suicide bombers attacked troop convoys in and around Matta, over 50 soldiers being killed and many more injured, on July14 and 15. Simultaneously, another suicide bomb attack targeted intending police recruits in D. I. Khan.

A very bloody day for the army and the people of Pakistan. A comparison of losses in such a short time in one unit can be made with Dec 5, 1971, when Bravo Company 23 Punjab under Maj (later Brig) Akram tried to breakout from Indian encirclement near Chaudagram on the Comilla-Feni Road, and lost 77 men killed and 27 wounded in less than an hour, with only 16 of the original 120 making it back to the Battalion HQ. Grievously wounded Brig Akram spent over a year in hospital during captivity.

The Ministry of Interior planned action against Lal Masjid in early February, but more than 6000 men, women and children in the compound provided very cogent reasons for delay, because any action then could potentially have been a greater disaster. One does hope that lessons can be learnt, viz, on how to avoid Lal Masjid-type tragedies in the future, and to cope with them if they did happen, which they are more than likely to, and to manage damage-control post-the-event.

There must be "zero tolerance" towards any tendency towards militancy. The good news is that those who use madrassas for pursuing militancy are in a vast minority, the bad news is that there are still enough to create anarchy. Many of the madrassas have revised their curriculum to include science and computer education. As for NGOs involved in education, they are invaluable for the poorest of the poor.

However madrassas in the hotbed areas of religious activism of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) must be cleared of weapons first. One can well expect casualties, which will be far less if action is taken immediately, or in the near future.

Similarly, in urban areas the problem can be handled if tackled promptly. The administration of the madrassas not involved in militancy must be taken into confidence and, along with assurances that no action was planned against them, given monetary and material help, seeking from them their vocal support in return.

The handling of the media left much to be desired, it has to be more sophisticated. A Media Centre must be set up to register media representatives with temporary passes that allows them limited access under supervision into the area between the outer and inner cordons.

Regular briefings (or immediately if there is "breaking news") must be given, and representatives should be available for questions. There must be one focal point for media attention, the official briefing person. The president has made the right move by bringing back Rashid Qureshi, at least he is media savvy, who was the architect of the "glasnost" that got Musharraf plenty of media-mileage in the early years.

Everyone and his uncle in the electronic media got involved in "hostage negotiations." This is a complete science and the media must not (and cannot be allowed to) get involved directly. Whenever negotiations come into the equation, a "hostage negotiator," even though relatively junior, takes command of the operations, taking precedence over even the senior commander on the spot.

The commander on the spot will take immediate action only if he sees imminent danger to the hostages. Because of the various pressures on the psyche of the besieged, special expertise is required to gain the confidence of, and to persuade, those being besieged to surrender peacefully.

Communications to the compound should be cut, and only the hostage negotiator can communicate with them. If someone among those killed or injured has relatives in the US, some ambulance-chasing US lawyer will see a great opportunity (for a percentage) to launch multi-million dollar law-suits against the Pakistani TV channels seen in the US, holding them liable for the loss (or injuries thereof) of the relative's life because of their interference.

One cannot find any example of media involvement in such fashion anywhere at anytime in the world. The media have to remain as impartial observers and reporters, and cannot become actors themselves in the ongoing drama. Abdul Rashid Ghazi may not have had a death wish, what forced him to have one? Could he have been persuaded by the electronic media that his demands would be met?

A controversy has been started about the number of deaths. In order not to allow that to become a subject of doubt, a "media pool" (selected by the media themselves) without cameras, and disclaimers about their safety duly signed, could have been taken around immediately after the operations. The news and videos thereof being shared by all the media, as is done all over the world.

The media are the best witnesses for facts because, as impartial reporters, they communicate to the public exactly what they see. If they do otherwise, they do so at the risk of their credibility. The "missing persons" center was established rather late.

A "one-window" cell having capable operatives could coordinate news about casualties, arrests, detentions etc about inhabitants of the compound, satisfying the anxious parents and relations as to the fate of their loved ones. One could have immediately set up a call center with an 800 number.

As much as most of us would have it otherwise, Lal Masjid has shown us to be in multiple crisis, mostly of our own making. While externally, Pakistan's image has been shot to pieces, internally the confidence of the intelligentsia and the masses has been badly shaken. Most people seem convinced that the days of the Musharraf regime are numbered. Unbelievably, some are even questioning our own existence as a state.

The question very well arises, is the writ of the government able to safeguard the interests of the state? If it is not, then is it time to separate the present government from the governance of the state? Can this be done gently, or is it likely to be violent?

While, according to some, the countdown to a substantive change has begun, independent observers do believe that the real solution is a power-sharing arrangement that will balance the country's present mode of governance, making it a more democratic and effective. Can it happen so, or are we already (in aviation terms) in a flat spin, headed for anarchy?

Ikram Sehgal is a former Major of Pakistan Army, a political analyst and columnist.