This theory calls for redesigning of the international framework and the concept of state sovereignty in order to face the threats of the 21st century. Undoubtedly, some would find Byers' theory close to their hearts because it would sanction wars like the one waged in Iraq and the Nato intervention in Kosovo.

Opponents would argue that the Westphalian concept of sovereignty that was later further sanctified by the Treaty of Utrecht would face a serious threat, and that it would give major powers the liberty for intrusive action in other countries. But then, the traditional concept of sovereignty has undergone considerable change over the years.

Shared sovereignty in the European union, and particularly the anxiety of the new entrants from the former Eastern Europe to become members of the EU, is an example of voluntary acceptance of abridged sovereignty.

Gareth Evans, co-chair of the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty, argued that the commission had made fundamental conceptual contribution to the idea of Westphalian sovereignty in that sovereignty should not be seen as "control" in the Westphalian tradition but as "responsibility" of the state to protect its citizens within its territory.

Should the state fail to perform its responsibility, either due to inability or unwillingness, then "a secondary responsibility to protect falls on the wider international community."

Gareth Evans continues to argue that the framers of the UN Charter were guided by their desire that the horror of the Second World War should not revisit the world, hence the charter included the provision that "nothing should authorise intervention in matters essentially within the jurisdiction of any state."

But then, during drafting of the charter at the Nuremberg trials in 1945 recognition was given in international law to the concept of "crimes against humanity" which could be committed by a government against its own people even during peace time, and the 1948 Genocide Convention explicitly overrode the non-intervention principle for the most extreme forms of crimes against humanity.

The world, however, merrily continued to ignore its responsibility, as was seen in the killing fields stretching from Cambodia to Rwanda to Srebrenica to Darfur.

During the Cold War, the two superpowers paid scant attention to sovereignty of states when the then Soviet Union invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the US intervened in Granada and Panama. If one were to remind oneself of the Monroe Doctrine directed at the colonial powers of that time one could argue about the source of President Monroe's power to issue the edict.

It is not contested that the Monroe Doctrine had the good effect of dissuading the colonial powers from encroaching into America's backyard, and gave assurance to the Latin American countries of security from the avarice laden invasion of the colonialists. But the fact remains that James Monroe, and later President Eisenhower, could not have warned the British, French and Israelis of consequences if they did not withdraw their invading troops from Egyptian territory during the Suez crisis, but for the power the US could wield to force its decision.

This was amply demonstrated during the invasion of Iraq in the face of opposition of the UNSC and the opinion of the most of the countries of the world. If force is the ultimate arbiter in the settlement of conflicts, then one would find it difficult to disagree with Robert Kagan's view that Europeans are nearly unanimous in their conviction that Americans and Europeans no longer share a common "strategic culture," and that while confronting adversaries Americans prefer coercion over the Europeans' preference for persuasion.

Kagan further elucidates that while the US is less inclined to submit to international institutions like the UN and the International Criminal Court, the Europeans would prefer conformity to laws and rules governing international behaviour.

The point of this discussion is not the necessity of international intervention, it is to establish the principle of "exceptional illegality" in domestic affairs on the ground that when the welfare of the people is threatened by those in authority, who might have been elected but failed to protect the interest of the people, then forces within the country have a responsibility to protect the people from these predators.

And should it ever be necessary, these forces could explain their actions not in legal terms but on grounds of political and moral legitimacy. It is generally accepted that the formation of the Bangladesh government in exile under conditions of oppression in 1971 in the then East Pakistan, and the one formed recently following the resignation of the caretaker government of President Iajuddin Ahmed, the question of "legitimacy" of the people running the interim government has become a matter of semantics.

The people have accepted the fact that the present interim government is both constitutional and legitimate. In view of the popularity this government enjoys it is doubtful that its legitimacy can be questioned by the commonly accepted Max Weberian standard-traditional and legal-traditional formulas.

This strand of thought is further complemented by the Pakistan Supreme Court's verdict (State vs. Dosso) (1958) in which the Court held that "if a revolution is victorious in the sense that persons assuming powers can successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, the revolution itself becomes a law creating fact."

The series of convictions of kleptocrats, hopefully more will follow, and of the people who thought themselves to be above the law till recently, have revealed the magnitude of their crimes to the astounded people. The woeful events have raised questions among the politically conscious people about the pathological mental disorder of the kleptocrats' abysmal greed.

Perhaps the people of Bangladesh may pause to think whether it would be prudent to rush for an early election before the institutions supportive of democracy are in place and able to bear the responsibility that democracy, as is generally understood, devolves upon them. One hopes it is clearly understood that the practice of democracy does not end, but begins, with the casting of votes once every five years, and that the people elected are at all times accountable to the electorate.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is former secretary and ambassador.