Once that legal order is destroyed, the laws cease to have validity. If the destruction of the legal order is spontaneously caused by political disorder, criminal action, unqualified military rule with criminal motive, and anarchy, then the state has failed to fulfil the basic needs of a substantial element of its population and can therefore be called a "troubled state."

A state in trouble often casts fundamental doubt on the legitimacy of the regime in power. The disintegration of law and order also exposes the latent incapacity and failure of the government to deal with those problems.

The presence of a well-functioning government does not mean that a sovereign state will have the capacity to establish an assured peaceful law and order situation over time. Still, the government is spared the indignity of the jurisprudential insult of being asked whether law exists, unless the sort of chaos prevails that leads outsiders to label the reality as an instance of a marginal state or a failed state, or a terrorist state, as we are compelled to believe by the course of recent political events in Bangladesh.

A major reason of worry about "failed states," "marginal states," and "troubled states" is due to the suffering caused internally by a lack of security as well as the instability generated externally, either in the region or in the world as a whole.

A state, which is unstable internally, incites its more expansionary neighbours into action, as internal instability usually implies military weakness. However, it might also cause concern to its neighbour, being a source of refugees and a collapsing economy, which might have an effect on its neighbour's economy.

The economic aspect is closely related to the political. A system of economic distribution in a stable state relies on a reasonably stable legal system whose efficacy requires an effective government. The legal and economic system then determines our entitlements under this particular legal/economic code. This is a totally different thing from entitlements as determined by equity.

People get their entitlements from a whole range of positions in the society. They get them through work in the economic system; they get them through ownership; they can get them through some legal position such as being prime minister, attorney general, chairman of the public service commission, or head of the armed forces; and, of course, people can jump out of the legal system and acquire resources by stealing, either surreptitiously or quiet openly by force.

Working and owning things in particular require a functioning legal framework. This, of course, gives great power to the people in charge of the decision making process. They can ensure that they get the lion's share of what is available in the society.

Thus, societies in which the elite are difficult to challenge reinforce them by generous allocation of resources to them. In the case of open and broadly democratic societies this is more restricted, in that the elite can be challenged. Their activities are more transparent and they have less of a monopoly grip on the levers of the state.

Ironically, states with a weak and authoritarian political leadership in a dynastic political order supported by procedural democracy of a rubber-stamp parliament can both shift resources towards the elites and leave the rest of the population in poverty. Cases from Bangladesh to Nigeria correspond to this model.

In a poor country the prospect of diverting wealth to the elite is particularly appealing. Consequently, there is a struggle to become a member of the elite, bringing governmental instability to many poor countries. Also, in a poor country with inadequate or corrupt police, stealing becomes more attractive than producing.

It is much more profitable to form an armed band and rob other people than to go to all the trouble of making and selling things. The weakness of this argument when generalised to a whole state is obvious. Nothing gets produced, and the decline continues further.

There is a stage in the whole process where the economy simply collapses. Well before that stage the economy can be severely impeded by the profitability of crime, as in the case of Bangladesh.

A state is supposed to provide its citizens with physical security against attack, either internally or by foreigners. The internal attacks can come from political groups or groups of organised criminals. Essentially, there are two forms of internal stability: consensual stability and coercive stability.

Consensual stability exists when stability is brought about by normal policing and threats to security come from normal criminal activities at some moderately low level. This was the situation in Bangladesh in more peaceful times.

When criminal activities are at a high level, just like the period immediately preceding the installation of the current administration in Bangladesh, consensual stability is not provided even though the political system might be comparatively stable.

In this scenario, what is provided is called coercive stability. Coercive stability exists when states provide physical security in the sense of comparative order internally, but at the cost of severe repression that can legitimately be regarded as violence, and certainly impeding the liberty if not the security of the necessarily tranquil inhabitants.

The entire law and order enforcement campaign of the current caretaker government, with the support of the Bangladesh armed forces, is nothing more than a legitimate exercise by the "troubled state" of Bangladesh to deliver that much needed coercive stability in the very best interest of its people.

Troubled states exist only because they are recognised as existing by other governments. Sovereignty is given to them simply because they are recognised as sovereign. These states are called "quasi-states," of which Bangladesh is the most well-known one in Asia.

Internally, these states do not provide the basic services that they can be expected to provide. There is often little security, and killings on the basis of political disputes are common. The basic underlying infrastructure that an economy needs (which of course includes security) is not consistently provided by these states.

These states are amongst the poorest in the world despite being reasonably well endowed with natural resources like petroleum and natural gas. The very fact of recognition from outside, coupled with control of the means of violence internally, gave many elite of these "quasi-states" the power to enrich themselves in a way that any involvement in economic production would not.

They can channel foreign aid in their own direction, do favourable deals with multi-nationals for their own rather than their country's benefit, and tax their hapless compatriots on what little wealth they are able to accumulate in the dreadful political circumstances.

The past regimes of Bangladesh, characterised by political dynasties and elected dictatorships, have taken Bangladesh on the highway to becoming a failed state. Under such circumstances the current support of the army, with covert support and intervention of the international community, is a blessing in disguise for Bangladesh.

Chowdhury Irad Ahmed Siddiky is a freelance contributor to The Daily Star.