Popular sentiment favours restoration of the constitution and establishment of rule of law under civilian leadership. Justice Chaudhry has become a hero simply for defying a uniformed head of state and government, who is viewed by the people as having overstayed his welcome as interim ruler after eight years in power.

Activists of existing political parties are waging the campaign on behalf of the chief justice. It reflects the ground reality of Pakistani politics. The political forces which Musharraf claims are discredited remain alive and well, and are stronger than they were in 1999 when Musharraf seized power in a military coup.

Pakistani public opinion appears to have matured. Whereas in 1999 there were expressions of relief at the toppling of a civilian government that seemed to be committing excesses, there is widespread recognition now that military intervention is not the solution to Pakistan's political problems. Only continued constitutional rule, and an uninterrupted political process which enables the people to vote out governments, will bring stability to Pakistan.

On his part, Musharraf is relying on support from the army and the United States to ride through the current crisis. The army needs the US and the US needs the army, the argument goes, and both need Musharraf.

Daniel Markey, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, in an article in Foreign Affairs, summed up the dilemma for US policy. "Washington should not rely on Musharraf alone, but it cannot assume that his departure would advance America's main goals of fighting terrorism and promoting democracy," he wrote. "In order to achieve long-term success, Washington needs to build trust with the Pakistan army as it works to expand the capacity of civilian institutions."

There is no question about the army's pre-eminence in Pakistan, and most thoughtful people would not recommend ignoring it as an institution. But as the peaceful protests increase in frequency and size, the Pakistan army also cannot ignore the sentiment of the Pakistani people, and neither can US policy makers seeking "to build trust with the Pakistan army."

For five decades, Pakistan's army has played a role in Pakistan's politics with the acquiescence of the people. But now there is widespread questioning of the army's objectives and contribution -- a situation military officers are most likely viewing with justified concern.

The Pakistan army is a national institution, and if resentment against one of its generals spills over into resentment for the institution as a whole, far greater harm could come to the army's ability to defend Pakistan than even the most ardent Musharraf backer says is likely in case of Musharraf's removal from power.

An orderly withdrawal from politics might actually be more in the army's institutional interest right now than is conceded by those who see it as being indefinitely tied to Musharraf's absolute power.

Major General Sher Ali Khan advised Pakistan's second military ruler, General Yahya Khan, that the reason the military was able to snatch the initiative from politicians after the fall of Field Marshal Ayub Khan was not its fire-power but its charisma.

Sher Ali wrote: "If we had to shoot our way through Nawabpur Road (the main road in Dhaka) we would have had a conflagration on our hands that no amount of fire-power in our control could have handled."

According to General Sher Ali, the Pakistan army's charisma was "the precious political resource that once lost would not be easily retrieved. It existed because the masses had not actually encountered the army directly. For them it was a mythical entity, a magical force, that would succor them in times of need when all else failed. In the minds of the people, unlike the bureaucracy and the politicians with whom they had daily contact, and whom they knew to be corrupt and oppressive, the army was the final guarantor of Pakistan and its well-being."

What the army, as an institution, will most likely take into account in the next few months is whether it can retain its charisma without disengaging from politics, and without persuading its chief to pursue politics separately from the normal functions of the army.

Few people believe that a free and fair election can be held in Pakistan as long as Musharraf rules in uniform. Already there is a major controversy brewing over electoral lists for the next polls. In a sign of how an election under Musharraf would not solve any problem, the number of registered voters seems to have declined by 20 million since the last election--foreshad-owing the crisis that will come once the Chief Justice issue is resolved.

Husain Haqqani is Director of Boston University's Center for International Relations, and Co-Chair of the Islam and Democracy Project at Hudson Institute, Washington D.C. He is author of the book Pakistan between Mosque and Military.