Moreover, the book will sell well in the present environment. Some remarks attributed to me are such blatant misquoting that one calls into question their credibility. My views about the military's involvement in business, other than the four welfare institutions, Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, Bahria Foundation and Shaheen Foundation, are well documented. I do not need Dr. Agha as my mouthpiece.

No adverse comment was made by me about Lt. Gen. Zarrar Azim, my views not having changed over 36 years since we served together in the Chor Sector in 1971, he was in Guides Cavalry and I was commanding an infantry company in 44 Punjab (now 4 Sindh).

That he should be so disparaged by the twisting of my words is not fair. In an article on August 2, 2003, when Zarrar was a powerful Corps Commander in service, I had advised: "The Chief of Army Staff (Coas) must disassociate the Corps Commanders Lahore and Karachi from the Defence Housing Authority (DHA), as they are unnecessarily getting a bad name themselves and for the image of the Army."

Both Corps Commanders (Tariq Waseem Ghazi, than Corps Commander, Karachi, happens to be another fine officer produced by this Army) were being unnecessarily defamed because of their association with the DHAs. DHAs functioning necessarily involve transactions in plots of lands, and with real-estate brokers. With honourable exceptions, these are mostly suspect, even in the purely civilian sphere.

Dr. Agha was using a tape recorder for the session with me; she should make the tapes available. I take pride in stating what is a fact, whether someone likes it or not, even to my detriment. Despite being an admirer of the four service foundations, I also hold that Frontier Works Organisation (FWO), and National Logistics Cell (NLC) etc. should not exist.

FWO and NLC do good work in the specialised fields for which they were originally created, but the present range of their business interests and the uniformed connection lets the army down.

These self-created image problems of the army should be merged into the foundations. However, contrary to public perception, they are subject to audit by qualified Chartered Accountants, and the profits are not going into individual pockets.

To quote from my article of May 31, 1997, "Military industrial welfare complex," a copy of which was handed over to Dr. Agha, "The prime mission of Fauji Foundation is to benefit ex-servicemen and their families. Since, obviously, funds are required for expenditures on welfare activities, all the needs are met with funds generated by its industrial and commercial projects. A major portion of the money earned every year is earmarked for welfare (at least 65-75%), while the remainder goes towards further investment in projects or kept as liquid reserves. Welfare is directed mainly toward medical, education and technical fields."

If Fauji Foundation was limited to simply being a military-industrial complex with profits going for reasons other than welfare then, frankly, one would be apprehensive about their intentions. However, this Foundation has, other than its original funding of Rs 18 million, not received money or solicited any from any other source. It has grown on its own (4500 times to its present Rs 80 billion value), not only paying its due share of taxes, duties, etc. (Rs 7 billion last year alone), but spending most of its profits towards very visible welfare. In fact Fauji Foundation is a very potent example for the Employees Social Security (ESSI) and the Employees Old-Age Benefit Institution (EOBI) to emulate in meeting the welfare needs of ex-employees, whether they be public sector or private.

It is always a calculated risk to write one's autobiography while in power. In the Line of Fire made Gen. Pervez Musharraf (and by extension the Pakistan Army) the target of concerted attack.

A spate of anti-Musharraf/anti-Pakistan articles appeared in the international media in early 2006. We have the example of Field Marshal Ayub Khan's "Friends not Masters" contributing to his downfall, force-multiplied by the much orchestrated"Decade of Development" celebrations.

During the campaign against Ayub, the army never became a target. Four decades later, in targeting Gen. Musharraf and the Pakistan army, unfortunately, the aim of the combined opposition coincides with those of the committed enemies of Pakistan.

One should not doubt the patriotism of the opposition, and their aims are quite different from our enemies'. The politicians want Gen. Musharraf to quit, and the army to go back to the barracks.

Pakistan's enemies want the country to cease to exist, or if it exists, it should as a client-state of a regional superpower. And they know this can only happen by destroying the army.

To do this, they must start with the head of the army. Gen. Musharraf's success in the past has been based on good initiatives mixed with a fair amount of luck, with an overwhelming dependence on the latter.

While Napoleon was quite happy with a general who was brilliant and/or brave, he wanted someone "lucky." Pervez Musharraf has been very lucky in having destiny smile on him for quite some time. The concerted campaign against him in early 2006 was waylaid by the Hezbollah's resisting of Israel's incursion into South Lebanon.

To quote from the same article as aforementioned: "Pakistan has perennially suffered from an image problem, recently reaching endemic proportion because of the "terrorism" tag; notwithstanding that, we are an acknowledged frontline state in the US-led "war against terrorism."

The irony is that while we have been in the forefront thrice in the free world's engagement with its opponents, we have been pilloried from pillar to post by the western media, duly orchestrated across a broad front by baseless stories fed by Indian sources. The result has been a build-up of adverse perception about Pakistan (and Pakistanis) in the world psyche.

After 9/11 the negative fallout has been force-multiplied to the extent that the green passport is now universally viewed with barely veiled suspicion. Prestigious western magazines carrying stories divorced from reality about Pakistan do not help things. The government must soon take the initiative to confront our adverse image problem, we must get something done and soon!

Most importantly, we have to separate the internal requirements from the external image factor. Obviously, a full-fledged comprehensive plan has to be worked out and acted upon if we want to successfully cope with our rapidly depreciating image in the comity of nations.

The great tragedy is that the good image and reputation of nearly a million men (and women) in uniform is hostage in the hands of unnecessary commercial ventures, which, despite public perception, are not for individual benefit as are other business entities.

What was true in Dec 2003 about our image is very much a cause for grave concern four years later in mid 2007, is anyone listening?

Ikram Sehgal, a former Major of Pakistan Army, is a political analyst and columnist.