Explaining the context, he said that what happened in the Supreme Court auditorium was an "assault on the superior court." The gravamen of his charge was that the lawyers had "humiliated" the armed forces.

From there his ministers took over -- they went on to threaten the press and the media: "the media must abide by the code of conduct approved by Pemra." Asserting that the media had been "granted" unprecedented freedom, they implied that what had been gifted could be taken away. This is the logic of Musharraf's philosophy.

In any case, Mr. Muhammad Ali Durrani and others have "underlined the need for responsible journalism, and avoiding exaggeration in reporting judicial crisis." Among the duties of the media he emphasised were "they must not demoralise the nation by spreading despondency, distortion and ambiguity, while submerging the achievements of the government in the propaganda of vested interests."

In short, they should assist in what the regime is trying to achieve. Their definition of responsible journalism would require the media to be subservient propaganda arm of the regime.

However, panic in governing circles is now apparent. The higher echelons look like compounding their earlier mistakes by committing new ones. Sedition cases are being registered against prominent lawyers.

Courts are clearly under pressure from the government, which is hinting at various measures that will ultimately result in a purge of recalcitrant judges; the legal wizards of the regime can be trusted to think of altering the topography of the judicial field.

The president himself has threatened to take recourse to "extra-constitutional" methods to ensure continuity (of his regime). On the other hand, the judicial crisis has, in fact, put the Supreme Court judges on trial; the full weight of an aroused public opinion is weighing them down.

The second perspective, in second hand words (received through internet), of what the eminent lawyer Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim has said is that "time has come to say farewell to military domination or to the constitution." This is a succinct "summing up of the present situation's denouement."

It is certainly an apposite political statement, as could be expected from him. The needless emphasis on the case being sub judice is entirely off the mark here -- no one has discussed, or is interested in discussing, the actual veracity of the charges levelled against the Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.

What they all are citicising is the political aims behind the way the CJP was treated in the Army House, and later his own residence, for several days, including being manhandled by the uniformed personnel.

Every act of the government is a fit subject for political reaction. All citizens are at liberty to criticize or support the official action; that is politics as it should be.

A third element that needs to be discussed is (so far) the mini clamp-down on the electronic media and the general lecturing on the "freedom of the press having been given (by this government)," which carries a hint that the favour is going to be withdrawn.

In the context of this mindset, it can only be taken as a threat that the regime will control the press and media the way previous dictators did -- the way Ayub Khan regimented the press; the way Yahya Khan withdrew his relaxation, post March 25, 1971; or the way ZA Bhutto controlled the press; and above all else how dictator Zia reversed his press policy after his second refusal to hold a free polls, and the unique way he imposed pre-censorship on all newspapers. (There was no private radio or TV then).

As for the accuracy or otherwise of the two perspectives, an ordinary citizen is the final judge. The government claims to have achieved a great deal in the political and economic fields.

Many fault this assertion and say "look at the growing lawlessness virtually all over the country, with frequent breakdown of law and order climaxed by the May 12 carnage in Karachi, not to mention the mayhem that Taliban-like groups are creating in northwest Pakistan, and Balochistan Liberation Army's insurgency."

As for regime's economic achievements, no matter how substantial they may be for the government and the top 15 percent of the population, they affect the population mostly adversely. The gains, instead of trickling down, are rendered nugatory by persistent high inflation rates.

As for the constitution, the poor darling has been mangled, and the present regime came to power not through the constitutional or legal process but through a coup d'etat. Whatever political gerrymandering may have been done by effecting defections from other parties to create Q League in next to no time, it cannot claim constitutional sanctity.

The president himself implied that the freedom of the press he has "granted" can be taken away as easily; the hint is loud and clear. For the rest, May 12 explains the state of high political affairs in the country.

There is no doubt that the lawyers' agitation has introduced a new factor in Pakistan politics. It can morph into a popular revolution. But many lawyers have said that their agitation is purely legal, and is intended merely to reinstate the CJP after the constitution and the legal processes have been applied.

This is a profoundly mistaken idea. The objective character of the agitation is entirely political, as it should be: it requires stripping the military of its control over the polity. Nothing can be more political than this.

The regime rests on the support of mainly turncoats and defectors who would OK any action by the president. The strength of the regime is not in the hearts and minds of the people but rests on a bipod: the army and America.

Some people needlessly bring in Allah, which probably is a hint at the ineffable links between the Mullahs and the military; perhaps also because the way the regime is blundering into facilitating the Talibanisation process.

The lawyers will do well to look at the strength of the opponent, i.e. the regime. Needless to say that it is supported by the army, which can, in an extreme situation, impose another Martial Law.

The army itself is fully supported by Americans of most stripes. The regime has achieved marvellous success in assembling a coalition of economic elite: the feudal, big business, bankers, industrialists, civil bureaucracy and rich professionals are all behind the Musharraf regime.

As for the nominal opposition parties -- PML (N), PPP and MMA -- they entirely agree with the major policies of the regime; if they are ever associated with the regime they would happily continue the policies hitherto followed. There is no genuine opposition party of notable strength.

Thus, the regime can ignore what the Supreme Court is seized with, and decide to proceed with electing the president in uniform through the outgoing assemblies, which would then organise a 2002-like election and rule happily thereafter.

Unless, of course, the popular outrage becomes too loud and too explicit; in which case the army, with American concurrence, can impose a Martial Law. Don't forget that the president has himself said in a TV interview recently that he can resort to extra-constitutional means to maintain continuity -- to his own rule and policies.

Unless the lawyers' struggle grows into a raging and tearing movement for democracy, free elections and representative rule, the country may be in for baffling times and the worst may happen. The mind boggles at the consequences of what may be afoot.

MB Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.

Explaining the context, he said that what happened in the Supreme Court auditorium was an "assault on the superior court." The gravamen of his charge was that the lawyers had "humiliated" the armed forces.

From there his ministers took over -- they went on to threaten the press and the media: "the media must abide by the code of conduct approved by Pemra." Asserting that the media had been "granted" unprecedented freedom, they implied that what had been gifted could be taken away. This is the logic of Musharraf's philosophy.

In any case, Mr. Muhammad Ali Durrani and others have "underlined the need for responsible journalism, and avoiding exaggeration in reporting judicial crisis." Among the duties of the media he emphasised were "they must not demoralise the nation by spreading despondency, distortion and ambiguity, while submerging the achievements of the government in the propaganda of vested interests."

In short, they should assist in what the regime is trying to achieve. Their definition of responsible journalism would require the media to be subservient propaganda arm of the regime.

However, panic in governing circles is now apparent. The higher echelons look like compounding their earlier mistakes by committing new ones. Sedition cases are being registered against prominent lawyers.

Courts are clearly under pressure from the government, which is hinting at various measures that will ultimately result in a purge of recalcitrant judges; the legal wizards of the regime can be trusted to think of altering the topography of the judicial field.

The president himself has threatened to take recourse to "extra-constitutional" methods to ensure continuity (of his regime). On the other hand, the judicial crisis has, in fact, put the Supreme Court judges on trial; the full weight of an aroused public opinion is weighing them down.

The second perspective, in second hand words (received through internet), of what the eminent lawyer Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim has said is that "time has come to say farewell to military domination or to the constitution." This is a succinct "summing up of the present situation's denouement."

It is certainly an apposite political statement, as could be expected from him. The needless emphasis on the case being sub judice is entirely off the mark here -- no one has discussed, or is interested in discussing, the actual veracity of the charges levelled against the Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.

What they all are citicising is the political aims behind the way the CJP was treated in the Army House, and later his own residence, for several days, including being manhandled by the uniformed personnel.

Every act of the government is a fit subject for political reaction. All citizens are at liberty to criticize or support the official action; that is politics as it should be.

A third element that needs to be discussed is (so far) the mini clamp-down on the electronic media and the general lecturing on the "freedom of the press having been given (by this government)," which carries a hint that the favour is going to be withdrawn.

In the context of this mindset, it can only be taken as a threat that the regime will control the press and media the way previous dictators did -- the way Ayub Khan regimented the press; the way Yahya Khan withdrew his relaxation, post March 25, 1971; or the way ZA Bhutto controlled the press; and above all else how dictator Zia reversed his press policy after his second refusal to hold a free polls, and the unique way he imposed pre-censorship on all newspapers. (There was no private radio or TV then).

As for the accuracy or otherwise of the two perspectives, an ordinary citizen is the final judge. The government claims to have achieved a great deal in the political and economic fields.

Many fault this assertion and say "look at the growing lawlessness virtually all over the country, with frequent breakdown of law and order climaxed by the May 12 carnage in Karachi, not to mention the mayhem that Taliban-like groups are creating in northwest Pakistan, and Balochistan Liberation Army's insurgency."

As for regime's economic achievements, no matter how substantial they may be for the government and the top 15 percent of the population, they affect the population mostly adversely. The gains, instead of trickling down, are rendered nugatory by persistent high inflation rates.

As for the constitution, the poor darling has been mangled, and the present regime came to power not through the constitutional or legal process but through a coup d'etat. Whatever political gerrymandering may have been done by effecting defections from other parties to create Q League in next to no time, it cannot claim constitutional sanctity.

The president himself implied that the freedom of the press he has "granted" can be taken away as easily; the hint is loud and clear. For the rest, May 12 explains the state of high political affairs in the country.

There is no doubt that the lawyers' agitation has introduced a new factor in Pakistan politics. It can morph into a popular revolution. But many lawyers have said that their agitation is purely legal, and is intended merely to reinstate the CJP after the constitution and the legal processes have been applied.

This is a profoundly mistaken idea. The objective character of the agitation is entirely political, as it should be: it requires stripping the military of its control over the polity. Nothing can be more political than this.

The regime rests on the support of mainly turncoats and defectors who would OK any action by the president. The strength of the regime is not in the hearts and minds of the people but rests on a bipod: the army and America.

Some people needlessly bring in Allah, which probably is a hint at the ineffable links between the Mullahs and the military; perhaps also because the way the regime is blundering into facilitating the Talibanisation process.

The lawyers will do well to look at the strength of the opponent, i.e. the regime. Needless to say that it is supported by the army, which can, in an extreme situation, impose another Martial Law.

The army itself is fully supported by Americans of most stripes. The regime has achieved marvellous success in assembling a coalition of economic elite: the feudal, big business, bankers, industrialists, civil bureaucracy and rich professionals are all behind the Musharraf regime.

As for the nominal opposition parties -- PML (N), PPP and MMA -- they entirely agree with the major policies of the regime; if they are ever associated with the regime they would happily continue the policies hitherto followed. There is no genuine opposition party of notable strength.

Thus, the regime can ignore what the Supreme Court is seized with, and decide to proceed with electing the president in uniform through the outgoing assemblies, which would then organise a 2002-like election and rule happily thereafter.

Unless, of course, the popular outrage becomes too loud and too explicit; in which case the army, with American concurrence, can impose a Martial Law. Don't forget that the president has himself said in a TV interview recently that he can resort to extra-constitutional means to maintain continuity -- to his own rule and policies.

Unless the lawyers' struggle grows into a raging and tearing movement for democracy, free elections and representative rule, the country may be in for baffling times and the worst may happen. The mind boggles at the consequences of what may be afoot.

MB Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.