Just to prove that they were unlikely to be swayed by assurances of loyalty by senior military commanders, tens of thousands of demonstrators continued with their protests in support of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry even after the imposition of new restrictions on the media and the much publicized statement issued after the 101st Corps Commanders Conference.

As several Pakistani commentators have pointed out, it is expected that military commanders would express loyalty to their chief. The military is a disciplined force, and its discipline requires that the brass fall in line when commanded to do so.

If the army chief asks them to tell the press that they stand for the "security of their country under the leadership and guidance of the president and the chief of army staff," they will. How does a statement showing support for the army chief by officers under his command resolve the issue of Musharraf's political legitimacy and lack of public support?

The generals' statement had one other dimension that is significant. It took "serious note of the malicious campaign against institutions of the state launched by vested interests…"

This is a clear reference to the increasing questioning by Pakistani civilians of the military's dominance over Pakistani public life, and its alleged privileges. Musharraf's civilian minions, such as Citibanker and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, have been saying for a while that statements against the armed forces would "not be allowed or tolerated," with the ruling party president, Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain, going so far as to demand that those criticizing the army be shot to death.

There is no doubt that civilized, modern governance requires deference to, and respect for, institutions of state. But it is wrong, as is common in Pakistan, to think of the armed forces and the security services as the only institutions worth protecting. A state comprises an executive, a legislature and a judiciary. Political parties and the media are other institutions that support the contemporary state.

The armed forces and security services are one part of the executive branch of government, the others being the elected officials and the permanent bureaucracy of state.

A cursory glance at Pakistan's history would reveal that its judicial and legislative institutions of state have been under relentless attack since 1951 -- when General Ayub Khan became the country's first indigenous army chief. In the early years of this attack, a segment of the permanent civil service was the generals' ally.

History was significantly rewritten by Ayub Khan, and the various new offshoots of the executive branch he created (such as the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) to make it seem that he was gradually sucked in into politics by the incompetence of civilian politicians.

The fact remains, however, that as early as 1953 he had written out a plan for restructuring the Pakistani state. The erosion of the country's legislative branch, and the political parties that supported it, began at his behest.

The first frontal attack on a state institution came in 1954, when Governor General Ghulam Mohammed dissolved the Constituent Assembly just because it would not give him vice-regal powers. Since then, no elected assembly in Pakistan's history has been allowed to function normally.

Over the years, Pakistan has become a state that stands only on one pillar -- that of one part of the executive branch of government represented by the military and the intelligence services.

The judiciary's standing was diminished by making it repeatedly endorse extra-constitutional interventions and pledging oaths to military coup-makers. Only now, with Justice Chaudhry's stance against General Musharraf, is the judiciary recovering some of its prestige.

The military sub-branch of the executive also constantly circumscribes the legislature in its functions, if and when the legislature is allowed to exist at all. And then there are the ubiquitous intelligence agencies, hidden from public view but frequently seen pulling the strings in Pakistan's complex political drama.

The assault on Pakistan's institutions of state, that started with Ayub Khan's intervention in politics, will come to an end only if all institutions -- the judiciary, the legislature, political parties and the media -- are allowed to function independently under the constitution.

Claims by the military regime about criticism of one sub-branch of the state as a malicious campaign against state institutions, without recognizing the constant battering of other institutions, will not resolve Pakistan's crisis.

Husain Haqqani is Director of Boston University's Center for International Relation, and Co-Chair of the Islam and Democracy Project at Hudson Institute, Washington D.C. He is author of the book Pakistan between Mosque and Military.