We had, since the arrests of the JMB leaders in March 2006, warned against any euphoria that the arrests would help end religious militancy in Bangladesh. Anyone who based subsequent policies and actions on this premise would be moving in a totally wrong direction was what we had warned against, too.

But it seems that most of us had been dwelling on the wrong premise. The question that I was asked, by foreign media too, was how is it that the terrorist acts have not subsided even after the hanging of the top leaders of the militant outfit; as if the natural corollary of the hangings was that the militants would just pack up and go home, giving their mission up as a bad job.

The May Day bomb blasts at three communication centers in the country is not a signal announcing the appearance of a new militant group, but perhaps a ploy to lay red herrings to divert the attention of the law enforcing agencies. It may also be a notice of what is to come, and also an indication that the second string leadership has taken over the command of the proscribed militant group; and it is they who are planning and directing the actions of the militants.

What we have seen over the last one year is a natural reaction of the militants, unexpected only to those who are not fully aware of the terrorists' methods and means of operation. It would be folly to dismiss the recent bombings lightly.

We must not fall into the trap of the denial syndrome that was so much in evidence during the last 4-party alliance government, and explain it away as an effort to tarnish the image of the government. Tarnishing images is not quite a cost effective way of attaining the objectives of the terrorists. It's a waste of effort on their part.

The JMB, much as one would like to think otherwise, has a substantial membership in its core group, including women activists. There are likely to be many more as sleepers, waiting to move on orders from the leaders. Theirs is a well-established organization, and well structured too; and what about the "Jaded" al Qaeda? I have no doubt that they are old wine in a new bottle. It has become fashionable to use the name al Qaeda because it accords them validity while drawing attention of the media and the public.

There is the remote possibility that these elements may have an organic link with the international terrorist organisation, although there can be no doubt that a moral, motivational and inspirational link exists between them. As the 2006 US National Intelligence Estimate had pointed out, many new terror cells have grown up independently, without any links to any central structure. They restrict their communications to their own members only, and derive their ideological and tactical inspiration from the many Islamic web sites.

However, the reality is that the religious militants in our country have got their strategy worked out, as is apparent from their activities. The question is whether we, too, have ours worked out? That is the most important question, which should be addressed in all earnestness by the relevant authority and agencies.

While the intelligence agencies were not able to anticipate the three blasts, they had been successful in arresting a large number of the militant cadres in the last one year, which indicates a degree of success in preventing the perpetration of more and frequent terrorist acts. But a strategy, let alone a good counter-terrorism strategy, has other important components.

By all indications, the security forces are being reactive rather than being pro-active. There is the need to evolve both counter-terrorism as well as anti-terrorism strategy. The former involves going after and rooting out the hard-core elements of the group, while the latter involves a strategy to prevent terrorism taking roots by preventing both physical and psychological penetration by hardening the likely targets.

We ought to consider the 5-Ds of Kofi Annan i.e. DISSUADE (the affected party from joining the ranks), DENY (the means to the terrorists), DETER (support to the terrorists), DEVELOP (states' capacity to combat) and DEFEND (human rights while combating terrorists), while formulating our own strategy.

As likely as not, there is perhaps no strategy currently in place to combat terrorism in Bangladesh, although there may be efforts underway to put one together at the moment. What is baffling, although not unexpected, is the secrecy that shrouds such an exercise. What our policy makers forget is the very essential reality that combating terrorism (like all other types of war) requires the concerted effort of the Clausewitzian "Trinity" i.e. the government, the security forces and the people.

The people must not only be made aware of the government strategy, they must, at least in our case, be made a part of the anti-terrorism strategy. It is important to remember, as one scholar of the subject warns, "Terrorism is a thinking man's war that requires greater awareness and participation from the people -- not just the military and government agencies."

Thus, one cannot impress more on the need to formulate a counter-terrorism strategy for Bangladesh on an urgent basis. In this regard there is a strong rationale for seeking help from those that have experience in addressing such situations over many years, and, over time with experience, have been able to formulate strategies to combat terrorism and terror related violence. Of course, no two countries' situations are alike.

Strategies evolved for one country may not be replicable in another. The policy and operational plans must be homegrown there is no doubt, but in a violence ridden environment driven by terrorist acts there are common threads and common experiences that, which shared, will help make it easier to combat the phenomenon. And there is, of course, the technical aspect of the operation that we lack, which cooperation with our friends can make up for.

While we are looking for an appropriate strategy, what we also seem to lack in our counter-terrorism effort is the central direction that such operation demands. We are not aware of any central organisation that directs and coordinates all the actions involved in the conduct of the operation.

While all the major intelligence agencies have their own counter-terrorism bureau, one wonders if they are reporting to or taking guidance from one central authority. Next to a good counter-terror strategy is the need for a central authority for overall control and direction to successfully operationalise that strategy.

The author is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.