Committed to PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Vol. 5 Num 956 Thu. February 08, 2007  
   
Point-Counterpoint


Diminishing hopes in Sri Lanka?


If viewed against the current aggressive posture of Colombo and the LTTE's obstinacy to resurrect the peace dialogue, Sri Lanka's three-decade-old ethnic conflict seems to be heading towards further escalation in the coming days. Factually speaking, both the LTTE and President Rajapakse's government are simultaneously facing serious internal, political and administrative problems that are pushing the two sides to go for a showdown to defuse their internal issues.

The minority government of the ruling Lanka Freedom Party is still struggling to ensure a simple majority in the parliament. To achieve this objective, President Mahinda Rajapakse has expanded the cabinet to accommodate the defectors from the opposition so as to "secure" a simple majority for his party. Ironically, the 53-member cabinet, so far the largest congregation of ministers since independence from Britain in 1948, is a highly fragile arrangement that hinges on the uneasy cohabitation and compromise of people belonging to extremely divergent political thinking and interests.

The Marxist JVP, or the People's Liberation Front, which backed President Rajapakse to win the elections in 2005, has withdrawn its support for the government as a protest against the inclusion of right-wing UNP legislators in the cabinet. The JVP, which has traditionally been opposed to the peace dialogue with the LTTE, is likely to create problems for the government by resorting to street agitation. Similarly, the expanded cabinet has seriously angered the main opposition United National Party (UNP), which has practically abandoned the landmark October agreement with President Rajapakse to pursue a bipartisan and unified approach to address the Tamil separatist problem.

Now, without the support of the UNP, it would be very difficult for the government to move ahead with any new proposal to re-ignite the peace process. The government, which has hardly achieved a simple majority last week through cabinet expansion, will continue to struggle to keep this "majority" intact as nine parliamentarians belonging to the ruling party are austerely annoyed for being left out of the cabinet.

On the other hand, the Norway-brokered peace process, which was derailed last October, has little chance of getting re-started since the LTTE leadership is reluctant to return to the negotiation table with the Rajapakse government that allegedly violated the 2002 ceasefire deal by attacking the LTTE positions last year.

Apparently, the policy makers in Colombo have agreed on the point that until the LTTE is not weakened militarily it would be very difficult to force it into any kind of compromise deal. This thinking is quite apparent from the recent steps taken by the Rajapakse government that have stepped up war efforts against the LTTE. The recent military successes, particularly in the eastern areas of Batticaloa, have further fanned the feeling among the Colombo policy makers that they can inflict further military defeats upon the LTTE by shoring up the military operations before re-starting negotiations.

The unusual jump in the defence budget, from an estimated Rs. 96.21 billion in 2006 to Rs. 139.55 billion in 2007, is a pointer towards this thinking of the government. On the other hand, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), which has been spearheading an armed struggle for a separate state for the minority 2.5 million Tamils in the north-eastern part of the island, has further hardened its refusal to re-start the peace process.

The current obstinacy in Prabhakaran's stance can be traced to three factors. One, the government's role in creating and nurturing a breakaway faction of the Tamil Tigers, generally known as the "Karuna Group," which has now been registered as a Tamil political party. Headed by Prabhakaran's long-time former deputy, V Muralitharan, better known as Colonel Karuna, who led a split in 2004, the renegade faction is getting full backing of the government in launching anti-LTTE activities and establishing its control in the areas captured from the LTTE. The small Karuna faction does not itself pose any practical threat to the LTTE, but it certainly has its own nuisance value that is disturbing for egoistical Prabhakaran.

The second factor is perhaps the government's full-throttle military thrust against the LTTE positions. And now, after the drastic hike in defence spending for 2007, the LTTE cannot be expected to remain oblivious to the main reason behind this surge. The series of military successes in the strongholds of the LTTE has further convinced the LTTE leadership about the government's intentions to go for a major showdown.

And thirdly, the demise of Anton Balasingham, a very close associate of Prabhakaran and chief negotiator of the LTTE, who was considered to be the most moderate voice in the LTTE. Never a combatant, Balasingham, who died last month, acquired the position of chief ideologue of the LTTE -- he was the only one who could argue with Prabhakaran and convince him to show flexibility. It is widely believed that Balasingham was the man behind the LTTE's readiness to give up the demand for a separate state in the 2002 ceasefire deal.

With the departure of the only influential moderate figure like Balasingham, the LTTE is expected to become more aggressive and stubborn in its approach towards the peace process. Against this backdrop -- and amid growing reports about the government's intentions to do away with the 2002 ceasefire deal as the basis of future peace dialogue -- things are moving towards a major showdown in Sri Lanka -- with diminishing chances of resurrection of the peace process in the near future.

Dr Imran Khalid is a freelance contributor to The Daily Star.