Even if the US immensely benefited from the cooperation of Pakistan and the latter was adequately bestowed with favour and largesses, presently both suffer from a measure of disappointment which many thought was inevitable because of incompatibility of their alliance. Although Pakistan was given the status of the US' non-Nato ally the spirit behind their interaction was never more that that of client-patron relationship. Pakistan remained on the US' payroll of sorts for the services rendered by her during the war in Afghanistan which is still hardly over. It went on fine notwithstanding reservations on either side.

Now there seems to be some crisis of credibility with the both. There is an impression of Pakistan thinking that she did too much for too little which the US, frustrated over its failed wars both in Iraq and Afghanistan is seiged with the paranoia if Pakistan was not doing enough particularly in Afghanistan where from the trap of Tora Bora hills Osama was last seen escaping on a horse back during Nov-Dec of 2001. The Americans are still connived that he slipped into Pakistan's tribal belt across the border. In retrospect, the Talibans were not defeated in Afghanistan, nor quite destroyed. Before the superior forces they only vacated their strongholds as the part of a strategic withdrawal. The vast swathe of Afghanistan still remains outside Karzai's writ or American control. The very intensity of the US' charges against Pakistan that it is not doing enough to seal the border or deal with the Taliban/al-Qaeda elements points to the US' continued trouble in Afghanistan.

So, the Talibans are not defeated; neither bin Laden has lost the war. He is pretty much fighting it on his term. The West's Iraq invasion seemed to be a boon for the Ladenites because they got the Americans where they wanted them to be: in a deep quagmire. Far from reducing Islamic militancy Iraq has fuelled it bringing more recruits to Laden's cause. They would welcome another American faux pas in Iran to carry further forward their mission.

Consequently, now on an epic scale the entire region from Iraq to Afghanistan to Western borderlands of Pakistan is in turmoil. And none, least of all the Pentagon or CIA has the slightest clue of how will this end and stability return for America's eventual exit. There is obviously temptation on the US' part to find a scapegoat and none is more readily available than Pakistan. Therefore the pressure is mounting on Pakistan to do more or take the blame -- both from the US and Karzai government.

A day before the recent Musharaf-Rice meeting The New York Times ran a cover story in its magazine detailing bin Landen's escape from Tora Bora hills. The story quotes Gary Schroen, a former CIA official, as saying "we are never going to get bin Laden without the total cooperation of Pakistan and there is a lot they can do. It's all up to Pakistanis now." This clearly implies that Pakistan is not doing its utmost either to crush al-Qaeda or apprehend bin Laden.

This is in spite of Pakistan deploying 70,000 troops along the Afghan border, arresting or killing 600 terrorists during its operations in Waziristan, alienating its tribal people, accepting casualties from among its own troops, handing over numerous suspects to the US, withstanding the virulent criticism of its own people and on the top of all compromising a bit of its sovereignty in the process. Yet, Pakistan is told she is not doing enough! The perplexed authority in Pakistan look askance if the whole exercise was of no consequence with regard to its equation with the United States.

Pakistan meticulously followed the US' anti-terror script -- hunting down fleeing and hiding Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives, handing over terrorist suspects to the US authority and allowing US Marines and FBI agents to walk in and out of the country with impunity. Musharraf took high-risk steps to bring under leash the country's volatile bands of clerics, to silence anti-American voice and succeeded in maintaining an upward trend in once-troubled US-Pakistan relations at the peak of which Musharraf was summoned to Mount Camp David by President Bush -- an honour for any third world leader.

But when their president settled with his US counterpart for what many Pakistanis considered "peanuts" -- a $3bn aid package which is overtied, largely conditional and of a time span of 5 years -- it was a total disappointment. Even according to CENCOM data, Pakistan economy suffered as a consequence of US' operations in Afghanistan the loss of over $10bn. Although critics argued that their president undersold the country Musharraf's gain was immense in terms of his legitimacy at home.

Now tired of the US' constant refrain that Pakistan is not doing enough and an implied pressure to do more Musharraf has apparently jittered on the issue and come out with quixotic plan of fencing Pakistan's border with Afghanistan to stop once for all the cross border infiltration. But doubts abound as to its feasibility and effectiveness. But it is clear that the president's is an offer in desperation. He too knows that the proposition is impracticable. To fence 2,146 kilometer of border across a rugged and in some places inaccessible terrain is a matter of great engineering feat and financially formidable. But he wanted to parry in some manner the constant accusation of Pakistan not doing enough!

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.