And, if he is not our man, there is no such thing as permanent interests. Now it is a matter of getting our people in and their people out...If one is looking for any elements of shame or hesitation, one will not find it in the record of the period. The Bangladesh thing is much less prominent; much more quiet; much easier to do."

Although I still remained skeptical of Morris' thesis, in April 1979, Kai Bird and I wrote Henry Kissinger and asked him seven questions about secret contacts with the Mustaque group in 1971 and whether or not, as Secretary of State he personally had prior knowledge of the 1974-75 contacts between U.S. Embassy personnel and the Mustaque group in the months prior to the coup against Mujib. Kissinger was Secretary of State in 1974 at the time of the renewed contacts with the Mustaque circle and at the time of the coup against Mujib. By virtue of his position he had access to all the correspondence concerning Ambassador Boster having ordered contacts with Mustaque and his coup planners be terminated.

Kissinger wrote us back the following month complaining of our "astonishing letter" saying our press deadline did not afford him the time to respond. He added, "I cannot deal with the extraordinary mixture of allegations and innuendos contained in your letter, except to say that in substance they are so far from the truth that I am impelled to question the motives of your informants." We wrote back in June telling Kissinger that we certainly intended to write future articles and that he should not be concerned about our earlier press deadline. We would be patient. He should simply answer the questions.

In our June reply we wrote Kissinger the following: "We do not consider the questions we have put to be, as you say, 'far from the truth'. Indeed, as questions they are designed precisely to get at the truth. We know of no other method, but to ask with as much precision as possible. If there are details, facts, names or sequences with which you disagree, this is exactly what we would like to know. What is your version of the 1971 contacts and the 1974 contacts? In our view, to be 'astonished' is not to be specific in response." Twenty-six years later Kissinger has yet to frame a response despite several press deadlines having come and gone.

What I failed to mention to Kissinger in our original letter was that many of the same questions that we had posed to Kissinger I had earlier posed in 1976 to Khondhaker Mustaque Ahmed over tea at his home in Old Dhaka months after the coup that killed Mujib and after Mustaque had himself been kicked out of power by Ziaur Rahman.. Mustaque snarled at me saying that I should not ask him about such things. He told me to go ask Nixon and Kissinger these questions. He said they knew everything. Indeed, Kissinger might have been "astonished" to know Mustaque's view of these matters. Yet, somehow I doubt it would have made much of a difference in our being able to secure from him any specific answers to our questions.

Due to his own reasons, Eugene Boster did not wish to publicly go on record at that stage. Perhaps, going up against Kissinger who was master of the dark arts held no promise so close to the events. Over the years I kept in contact with Ambassador Boster sending him copies of periodic articles or correspondence on some new twist or development in the story. He seemed open to the possibility of being publicly quoted at some appropriate stage if he could be persuaded that it might make a difference.

He observed my periodic efforts to spark a Congressional inquiry into events in Dhaka in 1975. We noted that Bangladesh wasn't Chile, Vietnam or Iran in American politics. I called him once a few years ago when I was in Washington. Our schedules didn't mesh on that occasion but I told him I thought going public would be important. He didn't rule it out but for the moment his position was "not in my lifetime". I understood this to mean that should he pass away the path would be clear for me to reveal my source.

I had planned this year to go to Virginia to visit him. I had scheduled a trip in the third week in July hoping to persuade him that as the 30th anniversary of the coup approached we should do an "on the record" interview and I would have it published. It was not to be. On July 7th, Eugene Boster, passed away after a heart attack. I missed meeting him again by two weeks.

There are very few "on the record" interviews with a serving CIA Station Chief regarding events he lived through and in which he may have been involved. These were unusual times and today it is inconceivable that a reporter and a CIA official could have such an open and frank conversation. In September 1978, Phil Cherry, the CIA Station Chief in Dhaka during August 1975 coup spoke with me by phone from Lagos where he was then based. I wanted his response to the allegations that had been presented to us by State Department sources. We spoke for about twenty minutes.

Cherry categorically denied the accusation that he or any member of his section had maintained contact with any group planning the overthrow of the Mujib government. "The Bangladeshis were doing it themselves," said Cherry. "It's a great canard to think any coup takes place because of an [outside] government involvement. Almost always coups take place because of the people themselves."

When asked about the Mustaque network's previous history of confidential contacts with the United States, Cherry stated: "There are politicians who frequently approach embassies and perhaps have contacts there. They think they may have contacts but that's a far cry from any of those embassies involved in assisting them in involvement in a coup." Cherry insisted that he had been completely under the supervision of the U.S. Ambassador, Eugene Boster, "We knew that Mujib was in trouble. We also knew that no matter what happened there, no matter who overthrew Mujib, or what overthrew Mujib, we also knew we would be blamed for it...So we were extra careful to be super clean. To make sure all of us were directed by Ambassador Boster. To cut any contact which would possibly give credence to the theory we knew was going to come about. We indeed followed Ambassador Boster's instructions."

However, it was Boster himself, who had expressed the view that such contacts had not been broken by the CIA Station in defiance of the instructions he had issued in early 1975. This was clearly Boster's view. When I asked Cherry why a person at the highest levels of the Embassy would make such a claim, he insisted the claim was "absolutely false". He went on to argue, "There may be somebody who has a grudge against somebody there, and is now making these statements but I wish I would have the opportunity to confront him and discuss this with him in your presence."

In fairness to Philip Cherry he did not have such an opportunity. Ambassador Boster when he spoke with us was unwilling to be quoted and identified "on the record". The Ambassador, in my view hoped, that in the atmosphere then existing in the United States an inquiry into what happened might actually come about. Of course, it was not a certainty, only a possibility. In the aftermath of the Church and Pike Committee reports the mood of the country appeared to favor accountability. If a Congressional inquiry had been held, it is my belief that Ambassador Boster would have been prepared to step forward and give testimony under oath.

The difficulty with statements made by Cherry in the 1978 interview that he gave me was that in 1980 the State Department admitted to U.S. Congressman Stephen Solarz that meetings had indeed taken place in the period between November 1974 and January 1975, exactly as one of our key Embassy sources (Eugene Boster) had reported accurately to us several years earlier. The State Department's admission to Solarz flatly contradicted Cherry's statement that "we had no Bangladeshi come into the office and tell us anything about any plans for coups or anything like that."

At first sight there appears to exist only one of two possible alternatives. Either contacts with the Mustaque group by officials in the U.S. Embassy continued in the period after January as Boster believed or they did not as Cherry claimed. However, there is a third possibility. If Cherry was telling the truth which remains rather unclear, it is possible that Mustaque's entourage could have established an independent channel to authorities in Washington that circumvented Embassy channels or used channels other than the CIA.

Lawrence Lifschultz was South Asia Correspondent of the Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong). He has written extensively on European and Asian affairs for The Guardian (London), Le Monde Diplomatique, The Nation (New York), and the BBC among numerous other journals and publications. Lifschultz is editor and author of several books including The Unfinished Revolution on Bangladesh.