The second was the substantial success in negotiations with Pakistan Peoples Party, which also became apparent that day when Asif Ali Zardari landed safely in Lahore but was not allowed to meet PPP workers and sympathizers. The latter were prevented by force from giving him a rousing reception and taking him to his Lahore Bilawal house in a rally. The Musharraf-created Authority drew a line at public reception and the rally. That was that. The General was laying down the outer limits of how far can the Army-PPP rapprochement go. Asif remains undismayed and will carry on with talks with the General's men. That is a 3/4 victory, the remaining 25 per cent marks will have to go to PPP and its top leader Benazir Bhutto who has remained persistent in relying on American good offices and abhorring the idea of taking to the streets. PPP seems set to provide the fourth PM to the General-President, maybe BB herself.

The net result of Musharraf's three day Delhi visit is that the two powers will continue to discuss Kashmir virtually ad nauseam, irrespective of any results, though Kashmir-related CBMs will continue to be proposed and implemented. For practical purposes that is a solution of sorts for the problem. For the rest, more communication links between the two countries, including Munabao-Khokrapar rail link, will be opened, especially in J and K State. Consulate Generals in Karachi and Mumbai will probably be reopened. Relaxation of the visa regime does not seem to be on the cards. It will thus be a controlled relaxation.

Taking up the first success first, a few quick points can be made. This deal on LOC was available to Pakistan all these years since the Shimla Accord of July 1972. Why was not the opportunity seized that could have come Pakistan's way anytime it showed its readiness to accept all the implications of Shimla agreement? Feeling inferior in armaments, Islamabad stayed quiet for 18 years. It can now be seen that it was creating a deterrence to India in the interval during which conditions in Indian Administered Kashmir ripened for Pakistan to play a part; by 1989-90 conditions in IAK became conducive for a Pak role. The latter's putative nuclear deterrent had, in Gen. Aslam Beg's words, come in operation by roughly 1987; Kashmiris had launched a protest movement against India's misrule and rigging of elections. This gave Pakistan an opening. It manoeuvred and helped convert that peaceful and secular movement for self determination (basically for independence) into an Islamic Jihad by infiltrating armed Jihadists, the veterans of Afghan Jihad, into IAK.

Aslam Beg was right up to a point. India did stay deterred for over a decade; by stretching, Vajpayee's Lahore visit by bus could be taken as consciously being deterred. Kargil and Islamic militants' alleged Delhi attack on December 13, 2001 brought on an undeclared change in India's nuclear doctrine. It threatened to invade Pakistan in January 2002, its much vaunted nukes notwithstanding. It was a threat that was credible to friend and foe alike. Superficially, the Indians showed a readiness to let Pakistan use its nukes first. It would then wipe out the seven or eight urban-industrial centres of Pakistan from the face of the Earth. It is not hard to see what was the meaning of the threat: it actually involved using nukes first. For, no power in its senses would let another nation nuke its territory first and only later will it move. That strains credibility of the "no first use" idea. It seems nonsense.

Although, the Kashmir Jihad has continued after a fashion in its own momentum, Pakistan had washed its hands off it in September 2002 to end the 10-month long eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. Heavens be praised that some one blinked first to ward off the implied nuclear threat to Pakistan. One is simply not directly concerned with what might have happened in, or to, India, through one hates the idea of nuclear destruction of even Indian cities where many decent people live. But what is relevant here is the denouement of Jihad: Kashmiris are not an inch closer to their Azadi after having buried up to 70-80,000 young men and a horrendous loss of limbs and property. If their peaceful political movement till 1989 had been left alone, the Kashmiris would certainly have gained something more than what is on offer today -- and not more than a few thousand would have gone to jail.

One hates to quote oneself. It is bad form. But the Pakistani generals could have read any of one's columns dealing with problems created by Indo-Pakistan nukes after May 1998. In each of them, one concluded that the competitive explosions of that year have frozen the Kashmir issue dead. Neither side can threaten the use of force on Kashmir. A war between the two is now impossible until one is willing to countenance a totally unacceptable form of destruction on both sides. No cause is worth that kind of destruction. Happily the two major governments in South Asia have now begun proceeding on a more realistic bases over contentious issues, no matter how they have arrived at this commonsense view.

As for PPP-Musharraf talks, the outside parameters have been agreed. Should the agreement finally go through, the Army-created system of governance -- that is acceptable to the US at least for now -- has also been accepted by Benazir; the terms are likely to include her own Prime Ministership while President Musharraf not only stays with his powers but PPP is impliedly promising to uphold them, including being ready to suppress those who oppose them. Her situation after the agreement is implemented will be similar to that of Mr. Shaukat Hussain today.

Benazir and PPP, in the light of the experience of their two terms in office in 1990s, is that they accept the supremacy of IMF-WB advice in economic policy-making without question then and will do so again; in politics she has allowed the Army to run foreign policy and security matters to her own exclusion; she accepted Army's supremacy -- what with Eighth Amendment infested constitution and meekly accepting the summary sacking of herself as PM twice. She accepted the military's supremacy then and seems to be willing to accept that now. So what is the difference between Messrs Shujaat Hussain and Shaukat Aziz, on one hand, and Benazir and Asif, on the other? She has to show the reason to 150 million Pakistanis why should she be preferred over Shaukat Aziz, Shujaat Hussain, and Mir Zafrullah Jamali, and indeed over the general who matters. As for the enlightened moderation, PPP's record in office gives no indication of these fine qualities.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.