Some superficially think that MMA should somehow unite with ARD so that the regime can be forced to hold an early general election, preferably this year. Now, ARD is highly suspicious of MMA and regards religious parties to be too close to the military: Which is why the MMA is perceived to have stabbed the ARD in the back in 2002 by helping write Gen. Pervez Musharraf's Legal Framework Order into the Constitution. MMA supports the 17th Amendment even today that gave the General the power to sack the entire elected system.

True, ARD and MMA are the mainstay of opposition. But their positions differ both over how they have fared in recent years and in political philosophies and drives. ARD component parties have been out in the cold; most of them are the bete noir of the General. MMA parties had been at the beck and call of the military in organising various Jihads in Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir. Seriously, the Mullahs are dyed-in-the-wool conservatives, indeed reactionaries. In the system engineered by Musharraf both are partners: MMA controls one and a half provincial governments, viz. NWFP's and half of Balochistan's. Its current spat with Musharraf aims at winning more seats in the next elections as opposition that is not responsible for Musharraf's actions.

ARD comprises two mainstream parties -- Benazir's PPP and Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League -- plus a number of regionally significant parties like ANP and several Pushtoon and Baloch nationalist groups. The latter may have fewer seats in Assemblies or a small percentage of national vote. But their ability to organise struggles in their areas and influencing opinion nationally is considerable; their credibility is high.

Thanks in part to government machinations and in part to clashing interests, the two bigger components of MMA, viz. Jamaate Islami and JUI(F) stop short of alienating Musharraf to the point where he may send the ministries of NWFP and Balochistan packing. They differ in nuances: JUI has most MMA deputies; JI's smaller stake in the current dispensation enables it to take a more radical line vis-à-vis Musharraf; it aims higher for tomorrow.

Dissension is also to be found in ARD: On one side, smaller and more radical parties have a general suspicion against the two larger parties: PPP and Nawaz League. They fear that these larger parties are essentially controlled by the selfish Punjabi elites and are prone to cutting deals with military dictators. PPP is perceived to be more prone to do so than Nawaz League.

On the other side, Nawaz Sharif suspects that Benazir, given half a share in power, will quickly accept any dictator. Benazir does not want ARD to take too hard a line; it regards itself as a party that can inherit power. PPP's power base is, after all, Punjab. Anything not acceptable to Punjabi opinion cannot be espoused by PPP.

Several factors keep the opposition disunited. The government's secret agencies, guided by American-trained generals, are adept at psychological warfare, keeping the opposition divided and confused by making different promises -- and of course planting some agents inside them to remain well informed. Many foreign powers, mostly Anglo-Americans, are purposefully interested in who rules Pakistan. Pakistan's military makes the country especially valuable to the sole superpower that only makes serious moves for geo-strategic considerations. This foreign interest in Pakistan's military is a hurdle to a democratic dispensation.

Other reasons include: most of the opposition, viz. PPP, Nawaz League and MMA, actually agrees with Musharraf's foreign and economic policies; opposition parties have no different visions on how should the world be organised. America's sophisticated foreign policy not only deals with Musharraf regime, it cultivates military-to-military relations on wide scale. It humours parties on a case by case basis. There are no differences between Musharraf and opposition vis-à

-vis Pakistan-America ties, except that, following the US invasion of Afghanistan and Musharraf's U-turn on Taliban, MMA has become volubly anti-American. MMA view is based on the faulty notion that America is against Islam and Muslims.

Finally, some difficult issues have cropped up and older ones have become more aggravated. Look at Musharraf government: it is paralysed on all the major issues: it is unable to make up its mind over Kalabagh Dam and Thal Canal; it hesitates to enact what Musharraf has long wanted on Blasphemy and Hudood laws. Then, Musharraf's supporters are unable to agree on how to divide the Divisible Pool among provinces. Nor can Musharraf's partners agree on dividing Indus River system's waters between Punjab and Sindh. These are the controversies on which neither the military regime nor opposition parties can take a clear stand.

Behind these loom old perennial problems that question the basis of the state and its reason to be. Although Bangladesh became independent 33 years ago, a really workable Centre-State relations are still being sought. Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP sorely want autonomy as founding states of Pakistan Federation; they demand that federal principle be strictly acted upon. Do Musharraf and his henchmen agree one way or the other? Do mainstream parties agree on the issue? Divisions over water and finance aggravate differences over why Pakistan was desired; this polarization persists, with provinces wanting more autonomy.

Then there is the question of popular welfare. Was Pakistan to be a national security state or was it desired as a welfare state. If the latter, who is actually planning the citizens' weal -- Musharraf or any of the opposition parties. Verbally they all stand for popular welfare. But nobody credibly shows how he would promote it -- necessary details of methodology are needed for credibility. Does anyone recognise that popular welfare for the large rural and urban masses depends on meaningful land reforms and social security? Musharraf government has a firm policy of no land reforms. Who precisely wants land reforms within ARD and MMA? On foreign policy most of them are virtually united.

The question is how willing are the people to suffer the expected repression by basically the military government when and if they start anti-Musharraf agitation. Many commentators have noted that the people remain apolitical and cynical thanks to their past experiences. That means the opposition parties have to show how can they motivate people to join the agitation against a military regime? The parties have to ask the question: why would the people be ready to suffer bodily harm or incarceration? Can they create that kind of interest? As it happens, ideological fluff will not do; it has not aroused much interest during the last 30 years. Remember how easily was the MRD movement crushed. Religious issues do not enthuse people enough as MMA should have concluded by now. There has to be a clear nexus between the desired democracy and concrete ways in which democracy will improve the lot of common man. People have to see what is there for them in the struggle for democracy.

Explaining how democracy delivers and what it delivers requires detailed economic and social programmes that each party must present and it better make it credible: the ordinary people should be convinced that these programmes will actually deliver what is promised. A last condition is that leaders should show how can the people participate in actually achieving the goals that fascinate them.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.