The greater role of FDI on development can be perceived from the East Asian experiences. High investment rates have driven these countries' rapid pace of output growth. In the pursuit of achieving industrialised status, countries must develop a competitive edge in terms of quality products, market efficiency, and ability to develop and upgrade technology. Following the path of the NIEs (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), ASEAN4 countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines) prospered through export-led strategies by attracting FDI, based on intensive use of relatively cheap and skilled labour. These countries primarily rely on FDI as an important means for boosting technological capability. However, competitive advantages of these countries in labour-intensive products has eroded as countries like Bangladesh, India, Vietnam, and China can now produce many products cheaply.

Unfortunately, FDI inflow in Bangladesh is not satisfactory. According to UNCTAD, in 2003 Bangladesh achieved only 0.05 percent of total FDI while the proportion was 0.9 percent in India, 0.52 percent in Vietnam, 10.2 percent in Indonesia, and 70 percent in China. The statistics show that China has become the most attractive destination for FDI. China's success in FDI attraction can be explained by its abundant cheap labour-supply and large domestic market with strong consumption behavior. We also cannot deny the possibility of herd-like behaviour of foreign investors. It is thought that India is lacking behind from China due to weak consumption behaviour of its market. Moreover, India's policy toward FDI somewhat restricts easy flow of FDI. Although Bangladesh offers attractive package facilities for foreign investors, why FDI flow in Bangladesh is lower than the similar advantaged countries? This is not only a question for Bangladesh -- this is a question on FDI dynamics, as this is true for many countries.

Over the period of time, some theories have evolved on the nature of FDI. As FDI flow is changing, the theories are also changing. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was thought that "comparative advantage" is the main determinant of FDI which relies on "resource seeking." The relative importance of this approach has declined as it is unable to explain why countries choose FDI and not trade. In the 1980s and 90s, the nature of FDI changed, and it is argued that FDI increase with the integrated market. The theory is known as "internalisation theory." The theory explained FDI in terms of a need to internalise transaction costs so as to improve profitability. These theories still are not enough to explain why FDI chooses to exploit relevant assets in some counties but not in others. Dunning comes with a combination of the above theories in 1999 to explain FDI dynamics: ownership, internalisation, and locational advantage. My understanding is that it would be difficult to explain FDI movements theoretically, rather it is better to explain systematically by case-to-case analysis. On this ground, we can analyse what would be the suitable strategy for Bangladesh for attracting FDI.

If we analyse the FDI in Bangladesh, most of the FDI has gone to the energy sector. Comparatively FDI in manufacturing sector is not high. This may be due to the fact that Bangladesh has a small domestic market and is not fully capable of consuming quality goods due to poor economic conditions of the people. One good option for foreign investors is to choose Bangladesh looking at India's big market. The problem is that there are many tariff and non-tariff barriers in getting access to India's market from Bangladesh. This problem may disappoint such types of foreign investors.

The only possibility for Bangladesh is to get more access into Indian market if Indian investors come to Bangladesh by targeting mainly the Indian market. Tata's $2 billion investment proposal is one such example. Exploring all investment facilities in Bangladesh, their target is to produce goods that have demand in both the markets. Their investment proposal up to now is in infrastructure sector for which we have already achieved technological capability. The main target of technological transfer would not be achieved in this case. We would be happier if they come forward with their automobile industry. By this way it would be possible for us to build capacity in automobile-making industry. It is important to note that all the countries including the East Asian countries those already developed, optimised, and modernised the technology brought by FDI. Huge investments already exist in our energy sector, but we are not still sure how much capability our Petrobangla and BAPEX have achieved from the technology brought by international oil companies. We must have to learn the technology; we must try to reduce dependency on them. Otherwise, we would not get much benefit from FDI.

Attracting Indian FDI is important for various reasons. As Bangladesh has good opportunity to explore the market of India's seven-sister provinces, India's investors can explore that market by investing in Bangladesh. If they come here, they will act as an agent to remove quantitative restrictions of India imposed on Bangladeshi goods. In this way Bangladeshi manufacturers may also get the same advantages if they could produce competitive products.

Another option is to integrate with ASEAN. Joining ASEAN will open the window for attracting more FDI for cheap labour-intensive products. As the labour-intensive FDIs are now shifting from ASEAN4 to mainly Vietnam and China due to increased wage level, Bangladesh could also get benefit with integration. Since China's wage level is also increasing, Bangladesh and Vietnam should be the next destinations of FDI. These two countries may get more attention because these two countries are small and less diversified. Moreover, Bangladesh can be used as a center for marketing goods to India and Myanmar. On top of this, joining ASEAN may uphold our low-profile image that is also important to attract FDI.

Now let us discuss some internal hindrances to FDI. It is widely discussed matter that hartal-culture of politics has the most negative impact on FDI. I have a quite opposite understanding about this. Usually hartal is called some days before the date. Therefore, it is possible for manufacturers or producers to reschedule their shipment. They also compensate for hartals by shifting duty of workers on off days -- this is a very common phenomenon in industrial sector. I think hartal has negligible effect on production; rather it may have effect on transactions. So hartal issue should not be a big problem to the foreign investors. The problem is created by the negative propaganda on it inside and outside the country, which affects the image of Bangladesh.

If investors and businessman may be able to penetrate market supply effectively, hartal will definitely lose its effectiveness.

Instead, law and order situation can be considered as one of the most important factors in attracting FDI rather than economic factor such as interest rate, exchange rate, etc. If a foreign investor does not feel secure in the recipient country, he will not be interested in investing in that country. Recently some positive efforts are seen from the part of the government in improving law and order situation.

Different elite forces such as RAB, Cheetah, Cobra, etc have been formed. Some successful operations of RAB in capturing the infamous criminals put them in leading position as our regular forces could not be able to do that. Therefore, different forces are now in catching-up position. They are following leaders because they know that it is important for their survival. Therefore competition increases among the forces to capture the criminals. Now police forces are also under pressure to catch up. These types of actions definitely uphold our image which is very much essential for attracting more FDI.

In sum, existing investment facilities welcoming more Indian FDI as well as continuous effort to join ASEAN can be a good strategy for Bangladesh to attract more FDI.

The author is a Ph.D candidate at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo.