What are the "maximalist courses" in the Pakistan President's view? Musharraf attaches much importance to two subjects: Kashmir and the security environment. India's maximalist position vis-à-vis Kashmir can be crudely reduced to "we keep what we have" -- no change in its constitutional status is acceptable to any Indian government. Pakistan's maximalist positions on both issues are known.

On security issues -- the two nuclear deterrents staring at each other from close quarters -- the position apparently is a happy one, as stated by Ambassador Shaukat Umar in the First Committee of UN General Assembly: both India and Pakistan were committed to working for strategic stability and have declared that "their nuclear capability is a factor for stability in South Asia. They are committed to taking measures necessary to reduce the risk of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons."

But this happy position is not unqualified. Umar called upon India to accept new CBMs to enhance strategic stability in the conventional forces and to avoid arms race, temper its weapons acquisition and maintain an "acceptable" ratio of forces with Islamabad. He noted that a "durable peace and security in South Asia will require an earnest effort to: one, resolve the outstanding disputes, particularly Jammu and Kashmir; two, promote mutual nuclear restraint; and three, maintain a balance of conventional forces between Pakistan and India." Despite these prerequisites of stability not having been met, Pakistan concurs with India that "nuclear weapons in South Asia were essential for regional stability."

The foregoing is Pakistan's maximalist position. India has its own realistic hardliners. They do talk of stability and peace. But all these maximalist demands of Pakistan are likely to be rejected by them. They have their own maximalist positions: basically status quo on Kashmir, CBMs about the nukes are negotiable, no agreed balance of power with Pakistan in any field is desired, while the other six disputes can be discussed -- with India negotiating from a position of strength.

The Pakistani realists, sans idealism, need to reflect on what is the incentive for India to do what Pakistan wants it to do, now that India cannot be coerced. How and under what pressure or inducement would an Indian government change its stance on Kashmir, for instance? The idea of strategic balance of power with Pakistan is anathema to Indian realists: They want India to be a pre-eminent power in South Asia primarily in military strength, conventional and atomic; they would hate to be bogged down into any agreed balance of power with Pakistan.

Pakistani realists have also to reflect on why would India stop acquiring the sinews and currency of power for becoming a great power -- for the greater glory of the Indian nation, howsoever nation is defined. There seems to be consensus on this among large swaths of Indian opinion, mainly the middle class. BJP is all for the glory of the Indian nation it defines as Hindu Rashtra. For much of Congress, national glory is the goal but the nation does not exclude Muslims, though for some, unavowed soft saffronisation is kosher. Even some workers of the Left are no longer as secular as they used to be. So, what India gets in return for what Pakistan demands, even in its attenuated versions, needs to be ascertained.

That is where idealism comes in. Pure realism leads to acquisition of strength and with it comes the motivation and ability to take advantage of the weak. That is what realpolitik is: the strong can and will seize what advantage others' weakness offers. The first rule of realpolitik is capability virtually equals the intent to take what is the weak's. We can foresee what will be India's answer: India is a larger country with larger responsibilities and it has to keep pace with China and other great powers. Why should Pakistan or other SAARC members trap it into regional balances of power?

The same reasoning informs India's policies on other issues. India expects the weaker states to make necessary adjustments without inconveniencing the stronger party. Indians would not be the realists -- determined players of realpolitik game -- if they tamely agreed with Pakistani arguments in a spirit of sweet reasonableness; agreeing to what morality or international law demands would be unacceptable to them. Inter-state politics is not morality play.

By introducing some idealism, the "vision thing," one only recommends realism to be informed with morality and international law. It includes offering to India something in return for what we demand of it: Pakistan's demands cover solutions to all eight problems. These should be based on international law and fair play. It is not easy to think how one can produce sweet reasonableness among Indians for accepting the demands of international law and morality. That is the mischief of pure realpolitik, given the asymmetry in military strengths.

It is not easy to think of what can be offered other than a cooperative partnership, based on the commonalities of the Subcontinent's history of the last 1000 to 1200 years. Building on commonalties that exist for common ends is easy. There do exist bases for friendly cooperation between Pakistan and India. But that will have to take in most of the other SAARC members. The idea is to conceptually recreate historical India's ambience before the British acquired dominion over it. The aim of glory of a socially ambiguous nation needs to be replaced with direct uplifting of living standards of the masses of people in the seven countries by integrating their economies without disturbing national frontiers, the way EU has achieved both integration and preserved national identities. Why can't SAARC do the same?

Looking closely at the European model of regional integration, it is based primarily on the people-to-people reconciliation between France and Germany in accordance with an elaborate plan of producing more understanding and adding new commonalities. The vision of common prosperity of actual people can be acceptable to all SAARC members.

Harder thinking is needed on this "vision thing." It must aim at something specific -- constructive and worthwhile in itself. SAARC should adapt a programme of banishing dire poverty through a progressive social security system for all the inhabitants of the region in a given timeframe. The commitment should be legally binding which will force all states to reorient their priorities and this would become priority one. National Security can be left to attenuated armies. A huge shift is required. Can it be done?

It is even more difficult than the difficulties being experienced in resolving the eight problems. All that can be said is that if the ruling classes of the seven states can be persuaded into adopting this new aim in place of today's selfish realpolitik, there would be hope. It is feasible. Only political will is required. Means can always be found and, in any case, the goal is to be achieved progressively over years, not in one go.

The hardest subject concerns nuclear weapons. Both India and Pakistan are of one mind regarding them: they are claimed to be necessary for the security and peace of the Subcontinent. It is non sequitur. That is a huge mistake. No one in India can sleep without worry so long as nuclear weapons in Pakistan wait to wreak havoc in India. Conversely, which Pakistani general can be complacent about Indian nukes? There is no defence against these weapons. These are for mass murder and aggression. Their very presence creates profound mistrust by destroying trust entirely. Both countries have proposed CBMs supposedly as a solution of the problem. They are nothing of the kind. CBMs can only ensure that accidents and unauthorised launching of nuclear weapons will become more difficult. Just that much.

CBMs are sort of pain killers. They are not a solution to the problem of two hostile nuclear deterrents sitting cheek by jowl in India and Pakistan. The kind of crises that led to countless military tensions, three regular wars and several quasi wars, including Kargil, cannot be prevented by CBMs. The worry is about such situations.

It is the authorised persons' finger on the red button, given their track record, that is the real threat.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.