Unlike the American states, the European nations have no exclusive competencies. Many of the powers exercised by federal government are listed in the shared category. There is not a list of exclusive powers of national government, although they retain all powers not otherwise listed. Such distribution of powers between the union and the member states implies an element of subordination of the national government to the EU. In a federation it is considered essential that the two sets of government, whatever might be the jurisdiction of their respective sphere of action, should be supreme in their respective jurisdiction. Such supremacy of the legislative bodies of national government has been undermined by giving general primacy to European law in all the areas of the constitution. In addition to conferring more powers on the EU, the constitution unlike the USA, has made provision that such powers should be exercised by the unelected bodies, i.e. the Council and the European Commission.

The European Union, which originally started with six member states with the objectives of having a common tariff in order to promote economic activities among its members, has changed its strategy under the influence of France and Germany to acquire more powers for political integration. The surrender of such powers by the member states to the union, although in stages, has strengthened its case to move towards the path of a federal Europe. Such distribution, giving more powers to the union, clearly indicates that the centripetal forces inside the EU have won over the centrifugal forces, which I think, was not conducive towards the formation of a federal Europe at this formative stage. If the centrifugal forces within the EU were successful in thwarting the move made by the centripetal forces to confer more powers on the union, the task to transform it into a federal Europe could perhaps become easier through the gradual process to transfer such powers to the union, required of a central government to make it more effective.

The concerns expressed by some groups about some provisions of the constitution, giving more powers to the union, may raise fundamental questions about the retention of British membership of the union in case the constitution is rejected by the British voters. Germany and France on one side and Britain on the other side are moving in opposite directions with regard to the ratification of the constitution. In the power struggle inside the EU among the major European countries, Germany and France played a vital role in preventing Britain from playing a significant role in the formulation of the policies of the EU. Mr Giscard was successful in consolidating the position of Germany and France as dominant force inside the EU when the constitution, drafted by him, transforming EU as a federal government with more powers in the hands of the Council and the European Commission, was approved by the member states.

In the event of British people rejecting the constitution, the solution should lie in trying to reconcile the two contrasting views by adopting a two-tier system inside the EU. The countries which want common defence and foreign policy, army and judicial system as well as single currency and a harmonised tax system should follow German and French leadership for more integration. Britain and other countries, who want to reject the present constitution, may still remain as partners to promote economic activities as embodied in a patchwork of intersecting treaties and co-operative arrangements in which each of them should play their respective role in order to achieve its desired goal. Such two-tier system inside the EU, if operates effectively, should go a along way to promote economic activities and at the same time strengthen political union among the countries who want to go along this road. This should provide a golden opportunity to the integrationists to create a new institution inside the EU, though closely connected with it, to develop and materialise their dream for a federal Europe.

It is obvious that Britain cannot remain as a junior partner in a federal Europe dominated by Germany and France in case the constitution is rejected by the British people, although such rejection should not debar them from remaining as partner in the new institution outside the EU in order to promote economic activities. In what form or shape such membership needs to be retained should be determined by analysing the advantages and disadvantages of the various available options so that both their political and economic interests can be better served . Their choice to remain as economic partner may provide scope to re-negotiate their terms, giving them the option to revoke the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties originally ratified by the member states to promote political integration at the expense of the sovereignty of nation states by stripping them of powers to govern them in a wide range of areas.

The question may arise whether or not the adoption of a two-tier system inside the EU should be adequate to solve the problems confronting it at present, having regard to the divergent views of the member states. The adoption of a two-tier system inside the EU, assuming it can function properly in promoting economic co-operation among the integrationists and leaving the non-integrationists outside the framework of the EU, may help in solving the crisis facing the EU at present provided it can reconcile the divergent views of the European states who want more integration. The success or failure of such a two-tier system should depend on how the European states who want to remain as an integral part of a federal Europe should react to the dominant part played by Germany and France. Such reaction of the different European states, who may ratify the constitution in order to remain as constituent part of a federal Europe, should be judged from different angles having regard to their history, tradition, size of their population, location etc.

Despite the fact that France and Germany play a dominant role in the EU as equal partners, the French voters, unlike their political masters, have not yet forgotten their history about their resistance to halt the adventure of Germany to occupy them during the second world war. They may have every valid reason to remain under the apprehension that Germany, by virtue of their instinctive dominating tendency, may ultimately take over the control of the EU leaving France to play an insignificant role in the policy making matters. Belgium and Holland, who have a long history associated with their struggle to escape the domination of either Germany or France, may not be content to remain as mere provinces of Franco-German union. Spain and Italy, who have population as big as France, may not like to remain as junior partners in a federation dominated by France and Germany. Unless such questions can be answered with clarity it will be difficult to predict with certainty whether or not France and Germany will be successful in transforming the EU in to a federal Europe with more concentration of powers in the hands of their bureaucrats.

A K M A Rahaman (Sentu) is a retired British civil servant.