In 1942, the twenty-two nation coalition against German-Japanese-Italian axis powers signed a Declaration of the United Nations (the name coined by President Franklin Roosevelt), accepting the principles of the Atlantic Charter (earlier signed by Roosevelt and Winston Churchill). A year later, the four war time allies -- the US, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China -- agreed to establish an international organisation which eventually became the United Nations in October 1945.

This sojourn into history was necessary to comprehend fully the frustration and restlessness that has gripped the international community following the apparent failure of the United Nations to prevent intervention in Kosovo (though generally supported by the world at large) and aggression on Iraq (described as an unjust war by the international community). The essence of both the League of Nations and the UN lay in the universal expectation for security from aggression by others.

It is not true that the paralysis of the UN has suddenly been discovered in the post-Cold War era.

Indeed, the real cause behind NATO's birth was the protection of "our cherished freedoms" (in the words of John Foster Dulles) with military defence, religious faith, and demonstration of western political and social system as counter-attraction to communism. Inherent in this western move was their belief in the inadequacy of the UN security system and the paralysis of the Security Council caused by the use of veto powers by the USSR.

In the 1946-89 period, out of 232 vetoes cast 113 were cast by the USSR, as against 68 by the US, 29 by Britain, and 18 by France. Most of the Soviet vetoes were cast at the initial period of the UN. This led Canada's Lester Pearson to conclude that the UN clearly was not capable of meeting the threat to international peace and security which the western powers felt was gathering at that time (1949).

If the UN Charter were to be considered as the constitution of the world committed to the maintenance of international peace and security, with the Security Council given the responsibility to determine the existence of any threat to peace and to decide on measures to suppress international lawlessness, then any departure from the normative doctrine of international peace causes international concern. This concern becomes palpable as strain increases between the forces trying to guard against any attack on nation-state sovereignty as against the doctrine of human security enunciated in the mid-1990s by the Commission on Global Governance, by refusing to confine the concept of security exclusively to the protection of states, ignoring the interests of the people in whose name sovereignty is exercised.

Additional strain has been put by an era of globalisation turning into an era of American-westernisation of international concerns. Kofi Annan alluded to this strain in the Hague Appeal for Peace in 1999 by expressing his worry at "the inability of states to reconcile national interests when skilful and visionary diplomacy would make unity possible." He urged for the revision of the concept of national interest that has failed to keep in step with the profound global changes following the end of the Cold War. Kofi Annan's appeal was for subordinating national interest-guided policy to the rule of law. But the terrorist attacks of 9/11 changed irreversibly any American pretension to subject its actions to the dictates of international law. This was made abundantly clear by President Bush in September 2002 when he declared his determination to seek unilateral redress should the UN fail to act to meet the perceived twin threat of terrorism and of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In his quest to punish the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush received solid support from the American people and of the international community. So when the Taliban were driven out, the entire world either applauded or acquiesced with NATO assault led by the US on Afghanistan. This became obligatory as NATO for the first time in its history invoked Article 5 of its charter that effectively translated 9/11 attacks on the US as attack on all NATO members. Besides Afghanistan war could be construed as having UNSC blessings because the Security Council had established that terrorists may be considered as agents of the state that harbour them and made it illegal to sponsor or shelter terrorists. So the Taliban regime's refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida network to the international community made Afghanistan vulnerable to international reprisal.

In Kosovo, however, UNSC paralysis due to veto threat from Russia and China necessitating NATO intervention called into question UNSC capacity to perform its functions and revived anew the debate for its reforms. Reforms suggested are basically the following: (a) an increase in the number of elected members retaining the five permanent members; (b) two more permanent members (Japan and Germany) and three more elected from Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and (c) "semi-permanent members" with no veto power. There is almost universal appreciation of the fact that the present composition of the UNSC and veto power of P-5 reflective of the situation following the Second World War needs reform.

Former Secretary General Boutros Ghali observed in his Agenda for Democratisation that the UN had little moral authority to preach democracy to the outside world when it was not practicing it in its own backyard. It is often pointed out that four out of five permanent members are "European" (a concept that includes the US) and "industrialised" countries, the latter argument that goes against Japan's inclusion while in its entirety the argument works against Germany.

Besides, Argentina, Mexico, and Pakistan question the choice of Brazil and India to be taken in as permanent members. Despite differences over future composition of the UNSC, among member states its democratisation is essential to arrest the increasing trend towards unilateralism. One has to bear in mind President Bush's warning of the UN becoming irrelevant if it failed to act on Iraq as of the recent US Congress resolution on Sudan urging Bush administration to act unilaterally in the UN failed to act to meet the humanitarian disaster in Darfur. Kofi Annan's mild chastisement of President Bush that only the UN can lend unique legitimacy to military intervention fell on deaf ears of the Bush administration. But then one must recognise the fact of irreversible change in the global construct in the post-Cold War era in terms of nation-state's responsibility not only in its conduct of inter-state relations but also its treatment of its own people for retaining sovereignty.

In this context Tony Blair's enunciation of the Doctrine of International Community (in April 1999) becomes relevant. Referring to Kosovo as a just war based, not on territorial ambition but on values, Blair's doctrine contained the explicit recognition that states nowadays were mutually dependent and the national interests of states were to a significant degree governed by international collaboration. Blair's doctrine is essentially aimed at breaking down insularity of states and furthering politico-economic collaboration among states based on the values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and an open society. This automatically meant that dictators everywhere were put on notice that their minority rule (Saddam Hussein), ethnic cleansing (Milosevic), undemocratic rule (in many countries of the world) were not acceptable and the international community (mainly the West) would not stand idly by while disharmonious domestic rule and aberrant international conduct continued unabated.

Tony Blair had no doubts in his mind that intervention in Kosovo was just and delayed action in Rwanda was an unforgivable moral lapse. His doctrine was not meant to be confined to Europe or the West but would have universal applicability. It was obvious that in the application of this doctrine the instrument of humanitarian intervention would be necessary. Tony Blair was, however, acutely aware of the centrality of the UN in this quest for a world ruled by law and international cooperation. But for the UN to play a central role the organisation and particularly the Security Council had to be reformed enabling it to respond effectively to the challenges of the 21st century. Blair allowed that for too long non-intervention has remained inviolable and sacrosanct in the UN Charter. And he argued that acts of genocide and large scale abuse of human rights producing massive flow of refuges (from then East Pakistan into adjoining states of India and currently from Darfur into Chad) could be described as threat to international peace and security. Therefore the UN Charter needed to be amended to include humanitarian grounds as part of international law sanctioning intervention in serious cases.

Blair's doctrine of international community, writes Professor Robert Jackson of Boston University, is an interventionist doctrine that connects national security and international security with human security in foreign countries. Blair's doctrine, Jackson adds, is descendant of the old European standard of civilisation and in calling for UN reforms Tony Blair not only questioned the principle of inviolability relating to non-intervention, but also recommended that the basic UN doctrine of equal sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention would be subject to qualification and revision.

Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Democratisation laid emphasis on promoting democracy within the architecture of the UN, as the world's largest and most inclusive organisation. He felt a clear need for an organisation in which all principal organs function in balance and harmony. While Boutros Ghali's prescription would have been ideal in the changed circumstances prevailing in the world today, both the developed and the developing countries should join hands in rewriting the UN Charter so that it will be capable of meeting the politico-economic challenges of the 21st century.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.