Power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. Throughout the history of mankind, periods of apolarity have been short lived. Greek civilisation was succeeded by Roman civilisation that shaped the subsequent world history for the next two thousand years. The British ruled the waves and the sun never set in the British Empire for centuries. Concurrently with the British rule, albeit in smaller degree, there was French, Spanish, and Dutch colonisation. However in the enumeration of the history of civilisations, generalisation of the term "civilisation" has been contested. German philosopher Oswald Spengler described civilisations as living organisms, each of which passes through identical stages at fixed periods. Arnold Toyenbee also described a uniform pattern in the history of civilisations whose life can be extended by successfully responding to internal and external challenges that constantly confront it. Toyenbee, writes Samuel Huntington, identified twenty-five major civilisations out of which six exist in the contemporary world. Huntington defines civilisation as a cultural entity that finds commonality in language, history, religion, custom, and in the subjective self-identification of people. By his measure existing civilisations consist of Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African civilisations. The present discourse is not so much on cultural identification of civilisations as it is on the possible shape the past and present global power structure can take.

From George Marshall to John Foster Dulles to Henry Kissinger to Madeline Albright, every one in varying degrees was convinced that the existential American power had ensured global security, notwithstanding aberrant proxy wars and sometimes direct intrusion by the super powers, for more than fifty years of the Cold War period. Yet till the emergence of President Bush and his doctrine of preemption, the free world was happy with American leadership, the values of freedom and democracy, its propagation of pluralism, and its abhorrence of totalitarianism. These values, described by Joseph Nye (of Harvard University) as "soft power," enticed, enthused, and attracted both the developed and the developing countries. So when the tragedy of 9/11 struck American soil, the world was unified in condemnation of Al-Qaida who claimed responsibility for these heinous acts. And when the US pulverised Afghanistan to drive out the Talibans and relieve the Afghan people from the grotesque and de-humanised clutches of the Talibans that put Orwellian fear to shame the global support across the entire spectrum of civilisations stood firm and unified. But Bush administration's adoption of Robert Kagan's views that the collapse of the Soviet empire has ushered in the "unipolar moment" for the US with an entirely natural and predictable consequence seen in the proliferation of American overseas interventions caused disquiet in the minds of many people. Though Kagan's long essay was a serial criticism of European efforts to subject inter-state relations to the rule of law and denial of Romano Prodi's claim for an European role in the governance of the world, he effectively echoed columnist Charles Krauthammer's argument that after a decade of Prometheus playing pygmy, the post-Cold War US foreign policy should be unilateralist and pre-emptive.

The proponents of this school of thought were undaunted by criticism of friend and foe alike, because they were convinced that even the harshest criticism would not find any concrete shape of opposition. Perhaps this structural change effected by Bush administration can explain why sadism at Abu Ghraib prison has fallen on the shoulder of junior reservists only and the flouting of the Geneva Conventions in Guantanamo Bay is so inconsequential to some American political leaders. The recent public statement of a Danish colonel who used to command a Danish military unit under overall British command, that the British troops in Iraq are systematically violating Geneva Convention in their treatment of prisoners adds fuel to the raging fire on human rights violations in occupied Iraq. That the very basis of civilised life is the conduct of refraining as far as possible from the threat or the use of force in resolution of human conflict and always subjecting it to procedural and prudential disciplines is lost on the Blair- Bush administrations. Unfortunately the occupiers tend to forget the fact that the world has progressed beyond Hobbesian classical theory of security being the sole responsibility of the sovereign who alone has the monopoly of force to ensure security.

The world was getting comfortably settled to a regime of pacific settlement of disputes that was shattered by Bush administration's war on Iraq. Popular disenchantment with the theory of hegemonic stability (pioneered by Kindelberger) that asserts that an open world economy requires a dominant global power for its smooth functioning not only because in this construct of hegemony consensual order is implicit and (now denied by the US) but mainly because the US has proved to be an elephant in a china shop. Niall Ferguson, however, sees the US colossus having clay feet because the country suffers from several structural deficits. He points out America's growing dependence on foreign capital to finance excessive private and public consumption, the US as a net importer of people and troops deployment suffering from "imperial overstretch," and most critically its republican institutions and political traditions making it difficult to achieve collective focus on long term nation building. So if the US were to withdraw itself into a cocoon of self-isolation (an unlikely scenario) would Europe which is literally growing older be able to occupy the vacant place? The consensus opinion is no.

Besides, in the face of revanche de Dieu (revival of God) the transatlantic alliance, despite bruised ego and seemingly deep fractures, is being refurbished. The almost daily reports carried by the Western media on Al-Qaida attempts to wreak havoc on western symbols of power (Heathrow Airport, World Bank, IMF, and New York Stock Exchange buildings are being reported targets) is creating in the western mind a paranoid fear of a monolithic Islamic menace. That the Muslim world is as divided as ever seeking a peaceful modus vivendi with the West as opposed to revolutionary Islamic terrorism of Osama bin Laden variety is more often than not forgotten. Even in the unlikely scenario of a repeat of 9/11 with consequent barricades being built around the western world, the Islamic hegemonic moment has irrevocably passed away with the demise of the Ottoman Empire and its preeminence is unlikely to be regained in the foreseeable future.

Political scientist John Mearsheimer (of Chicago University) sees China as the most dangerous potential threat to the US in the early twenty first century. Other analysts, however, are not certain that China's sizzling economic growth will not stumble at the crossroads of free market economy based on private property and rule of law, and Communist monopoly on power which breeds corruption and distorts transparency of monetary, fiscal, and regulatory institutions. Chinese economy faces serious obstacles of transition from inefficient state enterprises, a shaky financial system and inadequate infrastructure. Besides, writes Joseph Nye, growing inequality, massive internal migration, corruption and inadequate institutions may foster political instability.

Despite Robert Kagan's belief that China aims in the near term to replace the US as dominant power in East Asia and in the long term to challenge America's global preeminence, political analysts do not believe that China would be able to achieve "peer competitive status" vis-à-vis the United States in the twenty first century. What is feared on the other hand is the possibility of an economic meltdown in China plunging the communist system into crisis unleashing centrifugal forces.

One therefore, comes to the inevitable conclusion that American withdrawal from global leadership despite current dislike of the display of American muscularity is more likely to plunge the fragile international order (after the Iraq war) into a vortex of instability and chaos which may see economic stagnation and even depression in the Third World, limited nuclear war in the Korean peninsula and South Asia, and increased incidence of terrorism caused by the states' loss of monopoly over agents of violence and the possibility of their transfer to non-state actors. Such terrorist activities are more likely to take place in developing countries that are likely to remain soft targets as developed economies will have shrouded themselves with impenetrable armour of security and thereby insulating themselves from the dreaded Orient.

A meridian line needs to be drawn between the two extremes of isolated prosperity and chaotic poverty. What needs to done is to reduce western panic to a logical level by unhesitatingly joining hands with a multipolar West consisting of the US and Europe and the developing countries that are no less threatened by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Vigilance has to be constant so that the contagion of terror cannot incubate. As Bassam Tibi (of Gottingen University) observes, a critique of western hegemony need not amount to a wholesale rejection of the West and its values. In this endeavour of a change of course Bangladesh like some other Muslim countries could enhance its socio-economic security by denying quarter to any form of Al-Qaedist religious extremism. In adopting such a policy we are more likely to succeed than many other Muslim countries because our societal values and traditions are comparatively more secular and less dogmatic unless forces of intolerance are unleashed either by design or by default.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former secretary and Ambassador.